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CONTROL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
IN FRANCE 
Charles Torem* and William Laurence Craig** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
T HE principle of freedom of investment by foreigners in France has, with few statutory exceptions, long been recognized in 
French law. In practice, however, exchange controls, requiring 
French government authorization for all foreign exchange transac-
tions within France, have supplied the legal foundation for govern-
mental control of foreign investment. Initiated in 1939 as a wartime 
measure to stem the outflow of the nation's currency to safer havens,1 
exchange controls were continued in the postwar era to protect a 
weak currency and were elaborated, in piecemeal fashion, to suit 
diverse and changing governmental policies. The complex and per-
vasive regulations provided an instrument which could be used not 
only to protect France's monetary position but also to safeguard 
other national interests affected by foreign investment. In fact, ex-
change controls were used by the government to screen all foreign 
investment, and to limit those deemed inconsistent with French eco-
nomic planning or political interests. 
As the French economy grew strong and the franc grew stable, the 
appropriateness of the entire institution of exchange controls became 
increasingly debatable. The existence of such controls weakened the 
claim of the franc to a status akin to that of the world's reserve cur-
rencies and cast doubt upon the feasibility of making Paris a finan-
cial center for Europe. Moreover, at least by the early 1960's, the 
government had tacitly accepted that foreign payments, trade, and, 
in large measure, investments would generally be authorized once 
administrative formalities had been accomplished. These administra-
tive formalities served, however, as a not inconsequential barrier to 
routine international transactions. The sea of papers to be prepared 
by industries engaged in international transactions and to be pro-
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I. Decree of Sept. 9, 1939, [1939] J.O. 11266. While the modem history of French 
exchange control can be said to date from 1939, certain texts, such as the Law of May 
31, 1916, [1916] J.O. 4840, which was enacted to control certain stock issues during the 
First World War, continued in vigor until the present enactments. 
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cessed by an overburdened administration served an interest of gov-
ernmental control which was infinitesimal in comparison with the 
cost in time, delays, and missed opportunities for the French econ-
omy engendered by the whole procedure. Exchange control regula-
tion was thus ripe for reform. 
When, on December 28, 1966, President de Gaulle signed into 
law the bill rescinding all the previous laws, decrees, and regulations 
relating to exchange controls,2 it seemed as if the millennium had at 
last been achieved. The law seemed firmly to adhere to the prin-
ciple of free exchange, the first article stating that "[f]inancial rela-
tions between France and other countries are free." The law itself, 
however, set forth only the barest outline of the future pattern of 
controls; according to the well-established practice the government 
and not the parliament determines the methods by which an eco-
nomic or social program is carried out.3 Thus, it was only with the 
subsequent publication, on January 29, 1967, of the regulations un-
der the law that the real content and effect of the new exchange 
and investment control program was clearly established.4 Reaction to 
these new regulations was enthusiastic: government officials an• 
nounced that a new era of economic freedom in international rela-
tions had begun,5 and various commentators concurred.6 But while 
it is true that the new regulations largely abolish control of foreign 
exchange as such, there has been no substantial liberalization of 
governmental control over investments by foreigners in France. 
Indeed, under the new regulations investments are submitted to 
control procedures which, in certain circumstances, are more rig-
orous than antecedent measures. 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE NEW LEGISLATION 
A. Prior Exchange Controls in France 
While exchange controls under prior French law in general, 7 
and their application to American investment in particular, 8 have 
2. Law No. 66-1008 of Dec. 28, 1966, [1966) J.O. 11621. 
3. Article 34 of the Constitution of 1958 explicitly limits the legislative powers of 
parliament, while art. 37 reserves to the government areas that are outside of parlia-
mentary competence. The practice of the Fifth Republic has been to make maximum 
use of this constitutional fact to increase government powers. See, e.g., A. HAuRiou, 
DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 805-06 (1967). 
4. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, [1967) J.O. 1073. 
5. See, e.g., Larre (Financial Minister to the French Embassy, Washington), The 
Liberalization of French Exchange Controls: A Step Towards More Freedom for the 
Movement of Capital, FRENCH AM. COMMERCE 18 (March-April 1967). 
6. Urquhart, France Drops Its Currency Restrictions, International Herald Tribune, 
Jan. 31, 1967, at 1, col. I. 
7. Jeantet, Exchange and Control Regulations in France, in 1 AMERICAN ENTERl'RISE 
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET 189 (E. Stein &: T. Nicholson eds. 1960). 
8. Dusart, The Impact of the French Government on American Investment in 
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been treated in depth elsewhere, a brief discussion of the law and 
regulations until recently in force will give some idea of the extent 
to which these regulations reached into every aspect of French inter-
national life. Studied with data on the dimensions of foreign invest-
ment in France, an historical analysis provides a necessary perspec-
tive from which to view the changes created by the new rules. 
The basic structure of the old system was relatively simple: the 
laws simply forbade all transactions involving foreign exchange or 
foreign transfers, except those authorized by regulation.9 Certain 
transactions defined in these exchange controls required prior autho-
rization of the Ministry of Finance. In other cases, transfers or invest-
ments meeting restricted criteria could be made without specific 
authorization of the Ministry of Finance upon simple verification 
by those banks designated as authorized intermediaries (inter-
medaires agrees)1° which had accordingly received a limited delega-
tion of authority from the Ministry of Finance. In all cases the old 
regulations required transactions involving international payments 
to be effected through such authorized intermediaries. Functionally, 
the regulations categorized all persons as "residents" or "nonresi-
dents" of France; all transactions between the two groups were sub-
ject to control.11 Reflecting the understanding that exchange controls 
were to regulate problems involving foreign monies and not foreign 
influence, nationality of the persons or corporations played no sub-
stantial part in the application of controls.12 
Controls applicable to any one problem had to be ferreted out 
from a morass of overlapping laws, decrees, regulations, and notices 
which in total comprised some 750 finely printed pages in one of 
the service publications designed to collate these disparate texts. In 
order to describe the over-all purport of these controls, it is perhaps 
easiest to classify them into three general categories: international 
payments, international trade, and international investment. 
The first category included controls over importation and ex-
portation of gold, importation of foreign currency13 and exportation 
of francs, and the use of foreign bank accounts by resident nation-
France, 7 HARV. !NT'L L. Cum J. 75 (1965). See also A. JOHNSTONE, UNITED STATES 
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN FRANCE (1965). 
9. Decree No. 47-1337 of July 15, 1947, arts. 2, 3, [1947] J.O. 6987. 
IO. See Avis No. 791 of the Ministry of the Economy and of Finance, Aug. 14, 1966, 
[1966] J.O. 7175, providing the latest list of "intermediaires agrees." 
11. See Arr~te of July 15, 1947, [1947] J.O. 6993. 
12. There were, however, some limited advantages to foreign citizenship. Resident 
aliens in France were exempted from certain requirements which would have required 
all residents to declare their assets abroad, to repatriate their foreign income, and, in 
some instances, to repatriate the assets themselves. 
13. Decree No. 47-1337 of July 15, 1947, [1947] J.O. 6987. 
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als14 and of French bank accounts by nonresidents.15 This was the 
literal control of foreign exchange. 
The second category dealt mainly with controls over those trans-
actions creating obligations eventually calling for the transfer of 
foreign exchange. Included here were restrictions affecting all im-
ports and exports, even those made without payment.16 The mecha-
nism for controlling such transfers of merchandise was a mandatory 
licensing procedure for all importers and exporters, coupled with a 
requirement that payment for all such purchases and sales be made 
through authorized intermediaries.17 The purpose of the import 
controls was primarily to protect the French balance of payments 
position; and when this position improved, controls on imports were 
relaxed.18 Control of exports was intended primarily to insure that 
proceeds of export sales were in fact repatriated to France.19 
The third category, international investment, included control 
of French investment abroad and foreign investment in France. In-
vestment abroad by French nationals was tightly controlled: autho-
rization by the Ministry of Finance was needed in order to acquire 
foreign assets;20 purchase of foreign stock without specific authoriza-
tion was permitted only in limited circumstances;21 and repatriation 
of all income earned on foreign investments was mandatory.22 Rules 
controlling foreign investment in France were highly complex and 
no less rigorous. Certain transactions-the purchase of French stock on 
the Bourse,23 the purchase of real estate or investment in real estate 
companies,24 and loans of less than one million francs to residents at 
14. While the opening of a foreign bank account as such was not forbidden by the 
regulations, its use and the failure to repatriate foreign exchange ordinarily consti-
tuted an exchange control violation. Arrete of July 15, 1947, arts. 12, 14, [1947] J.O. 
6993; see Ministerial response in the National Assembly to questions posed by a 
depute on Jan. 16, 1965, [1965] J.O. (Debats Parlementaires de l'Assemblee Nationale) 
38 (No. 12461). 
15. Arrete of July 15, 1947, arts. 27-30, [1947] J.O. 6993. 
16. See generally Avis of the Ministry of the Economy and of Finance, annxs. I, II, 
Jan. 30, 1967, [1967] J.O. 1130, 1131, for a complete list of old regulations relating to 
trade. 
17. See Decree of Nov. 30, 1944, published in R.ECUEIL DES TEXTES DU l\IINISTERE DE 
L'ECONOMIB ET DES FINANCES, LOIS, DECRETS, ORDONNANCES ET ARRttls 18 (3d ed. 1966), 
setting up a wartime prohibition of imports and exports without individual licenses. 
This regime was subsequently relaxed by provision for blanket licenses. 
18. Avis aux importateurs and Avis No. 727 of Nov. 25, 1961, [1961] J.O. 10825. 
19. Arrete of July 15, 1947, arts. 12-18, [1947] J.O. 6993; Avis aux exportateurs and 
Avis No. 783 of Sept. 11, 1965, [1965] J.O. 8108. 
20. Decree No. 47-1337 of July 15, 1947, art. 23, [1947] J.O. 6987. 
21. See Arrete of March 16, 1962, art. 7, [1962] J.O. 3055. 
22. Arrete of July 15, 1947, art. 12, [1947] J.O. 6993. 
23. Avis No. 762 of Aug. 21, 1963, [1963] J.O. 7730, amending Avis No. 669 of 
Jan. 21, 1959, tit. I, para. A(l), [1959] J.O. 1130. 
24. Decree No. 47-1337 of July 15, 1947, art. 51(1), [1947] J.O. 6987; Avis No. 716 of 
July 23, 1960, [1960] J.O. 6774, amending Avis No. 669 of Jan. 21, 1959, tit. I, [1959] 
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a rate of interest not exceeding four per cent-did not require spe-
cial authorization of the Ministry of Finance but had to be effected, 
nonetheless, through authorized intermediaries. Other transactions 
-the formation of French commercial companies, the establishment 
of branch offices in France,25 the investment in French companies not 
listed on the Bourse, and the patent, trademark, or know-how agree-
ments with residents,26 to name a few-required authorization by the 
1\Hnistry of Finance, no matter whether the investment was to be 
made in cash, or contributions in kind; and, once again, all payments 
had to be made through authorized intermediaries. 
B. The Dimensions of the Foreign Investment Problem 
Since exchange controls find their justification in the protection 
of a weak balance of payments and protection against local currency 
outflows, it is only with great difficulty that the justification for 
having applied these rules to measure and control foreign investment 
in France can be found. Foreign investment, financed with capital 
exported from the investor's own country, has actually strengthened 
France's balance of payments position.27 Indeed, even if one accepts 
the artificial assumption that every foreign investment carries with 
it the prospect of eventual disinvestment and the conversion of the 
proceeds into foreign currency, no real balance of payments problem 
can be found. It was estimated in 1965, by the French, that cumu-
lative foreign investment in France totaled $5 billion, which may be 
compared with an unofficial estimate of $8 billion as the cumulative 
total of French investment abroad.28 Total American investment, 
J.O. ll30. See also Note No. 498 of March 19, 1964, from the Minister of Finance and 
of the Economy to authorized intermediaries. 
25. Although technically it was investment in a branch office and not the creation 
of a branch itself that was subject to prior Ministry of Finance authorization, as a 
practical matter the establishment of a branch office almost always entails some ex-
penditure, and therefore authorization was usually needed upon creation. The fact 
that such authorization carried with it the right to disinvest provided an independent 
interest in making application. 
26. Decree No. 47-1337 of July 15, 1947, art. 2, [1947] J.O. 6993. 
27. Where foreign investment is financed by money raised in France, a trend which 
is now well defined in the case of American investment, there is, of course, no positive 
contribution to the French balance of payments. It has been estimated that fifty-five 
per cent of American investment in Europe in 1965 was financed on the European 
capital market, thirty-five per cent by European government subsidies and self-financ-
ing, and only ten per cent by transfer of dollars from the United States. See Address 
by Oliver Guichard, Minister of Industry, to the American Chamber of Commerce in 
France, COMMERCE IN FRANCE No. 242, at 15 (Dec. 15, 1967). 
28. MINISTERE DE L'lNDUSJ1UE, RAPPORT SUR LES !NVESTISSEMENTS ETRANGERS DANS 
t'INDUSTRIE FRANyAISE 3 (1965) (Bockanowski Report). The estimate of French invest-
ment abroad is attributed to Marcel Cazes, Directeur General of the Credit Lyonnais 
Bank. 
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which the French consider to be a special problem, amounted to 
about $2.5 billion,29 while French investments in the United States 
have been unofficially estimated at about $2 billion.80 
But if foreign investment does not pose the kind of problem for 
which exchange controls, as such, are a traditional remedy, still the 
French consider foreign investment to pose other problems neces-
sitating some kind of government surveillance. Direct investment, 
involving control by foreigners of French enterprises, is of greatest 
concern to the French, and foreign, particularly American, invest-
ment has in recent years been largely of this sort. While accurate 
statistics as to the cumulative value of foreign direct investment in 
France and the American share of this total are difficult to obtain, it 
is roughly estimated by French sources that $4 billion of the total 
$5 billion foreign investment figure is direct investment,81 and 
American sources further estimate that American direct investment 
constitutes $1.75 billion.32 
The impact of such foreign investments on particular industries 
is demonstrated by a Ministry of Finance study indicating that the 
following percentages of production in 1962 originated from firms in 
which foreign investment accounted for ownership of twenty per 
cent or more of the capital of the firm: 33 
Musical instruments 
Gasoline and petroleum products 
Radio and television services 
Fat products 
Precision instruments, optics, and watches 
Rubber and asbestos 
Film production 
45.6% 
43.0% 
45.7% 
36.4% 
34.0% 
24.5% 
16.0% 
The Ministry of Industry has made a further study, breaking 
down the categories into particular products, and has found that 
companies in which Americans owned at least twenty per cent of the 
29. Id. at 4. 
30. :Bojin, French Investments in the United States, COMMERCE IN FRANCE No. 219, 
at ix (1966). Most of this amount is portfolio investment rather than direct invest-
ment. 
31. M1NISTERE DE L'!NDUSTRIE, supra note 28. The statistics appear to be valid as of 
the end of 1962. 
32. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT :BUSINESS 42 (Sept. 1967) (estimate 
based on situation at the end of 1966). At the end of 1962 the cumulative value of 
United States investment was $1.63 billion. The over-all effect of such investment 
should not be overestimated, however, as foreign investment constitutes only five to 
eight per cent of total French capital investment. [1966) J.O. (Avis et Rapports du 
Conseil Economique et Social) 11 (May 28, 1966). See also Le Monde, Jan. 14-15, 1968, 
at 7, col. 2 for 1967 statistics. 
33. MINISTERE DE L'ECONOMIE ET DES FINANCES, STATISTIQUES ET ETUDES FINANCIERS 
No. 219, at 326 (March 1967). 
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capital accounted for the following percentages of 1963 produc-
tion:34 
Razor blades and safety razors 
Adding machines 
Bottle caps 
Sewing machines 
Electric razors 
Statistical and electronic equipment 
Telegraph and telephone equipment 
Tractors and agricultural equipment 
Refrigerating equipment 
Industrial furnaces 
These statistics are indicative of a situation which raises a very 
real fear in French governmental circles of foreign takeovers of cer-
tain key sectors of the French economy. These figures, however, are 
somewhat out of date and do not illustrate the effect of the most 
recent boosts in foreign investment; rather, they tell only a very 
small part of the story. Annual foreign direct investment tripled 
between 1960 and 1964.35 Annual American direct investment, 
which, according to French sources, amounted to twenty-eight per 
cent of foreign direct investment in 1964,36 led investment by any 
other country by a large margin.37 
American statistics indicate the following progression of United 
States annual direct investment in France:38 
1959 
51 
1960 
53 
(millions of dollars) 
1961 1962 1963 1964 
% IM IM I~ 
34. MINISTER£ DE L'!NDUSTRIE, supra note 28, at 25, 26. 
1965 
152 
1966 
93 
35. Response in the National Assembly of M. Debre, Ministry of Finance, to ques-
tion of M. Albert Fouet, depute, on May 27, 1966, [1966] J.O. 1537. See also MINISTER£ 
DE L'ECONOMlE ET DES FINANCES, BALANCE DES PAIEMENTS DE L'ANNEE 1966, at 122-23 ijuly 
1967) (recapitulating balance of payments position from 1959 to 1966); MINISTER£ DE 
L'INDUSTRIE, supra note 28, at 3. 
36. Response by M. Debre in the National Assembly, supra note 35. For a state-
ment that United States direct investment constituted forty-five per cent of the direct 
investment approved by the Ministry of Industry in 1964, see MINISTER£ DE L'INDUSTRIE, 
supra note 28, at 4, 9. It should be recalled that not all investment applications sub-
mitted to the Ministry of Finance are necessarily referred to the Ministry of Industry. 
If direct investment and long-term loans are considered together, United States partici-
pation was only twenty-five per cent in 1964. [1966) J.O. (Avis et Rapports du Conseil 
Economique et Social) 377, 400 (May 28, 1966). 
37. The runners-up are generally considered to be Switzerland, Great Britain, Bel-
gium, and Germany. See MINISTER£ DE L'INDUSTRIE, supra note 28, at 4, 9; [1966] J.O. 
(Avis et Rapports du Economique et Social) 377, 400 (1-:fay 28, 1966). The Min-
istry of Finance statistics, prepared from a balance of payment point of view, probably 
overvalue investment from Switzerland and Belgium, which are used by third countries 
as transit points for investment in France. 
38. U.S. DEP'T OF CoMIIU:RCE, supra note 32, at 22 (Aug. 1961), 22 (Aug. 1962), 18 
(Aug. 1963), IO (Aug. 1964), 24 (Sept. 1965), 34 (Sept. 1966), 42 (Sept. 1967). 
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These figures, based on net capital outflow,39 indicate United States 
direct investment from a current balance of payments viewpoint. 
Probably of even greater concern to the French is the steady in-
crease in the value of cumulative American investment in France, as 
illustrated in the chart below:40 
1959 
640 
1960 
741 
(millions of dollars) 
1961 1962 1963 1964 
860 1,630 1,240 1,446 
1965 
1,609 
1966 
1,758 
Since these figures take into account not only additional yearly 
investments, but also retention of earnings of French subsidiaries 
of United States companies, they indicate quite accurately the full 
economic power of the American capital invasion. 
The impact of foreign investment on the French economy is ac-
centuated by the concentration of a very high proportion of annual 
foreign investment in a few large commitments;41 the large foreign 
investor undoubtedly has a great deal more influence over the French 
economy than do the hundreds of small investors who are permitted 
each year to enter the French economy without much difficulty. 
Moreover, the companies which attract foreign takeovers are very 
often in technologically advanced industries, where foreign control 
is particularly suspect, due to the feeling that foreign ownership 
leads to dependence on foreign research and development, payment 
of technical assistance fees abroad, and inhibition of purely French 
advanced technology. 
Considering that France has a planned economy, upon which 
traditionally controlled foreign investments exert a substantial im-
pact, it was predictable that abolition of the entire exchange control 
apparatus would not necessarily liberate foreign investment from 
all control. Examination of the new law and its regulations demon-
strates the importance which the French have lent to maintaining 
and intensifying control of such investment despite the general aboli-
tion of exchange controls. 
III. THE NEW REGIME OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN FRANCE 
A. The Structure of the Law 
The proposed law on foreign economic relations presented to the 
National Assembly in December 1966 provided both a broad, gen-
39. Both "direct investment" and "net capital outflow" as defined in the Sept. 1967 
SURVEY, supra note 32, at 46-47, include loans from United States parent companies to 
subsidiaries and investment in plant and equipment from proceeds of foreign loans or 
other financing. 
40. See authority cited in note 38 supra. 
41. See, e.g., analysis of foreign investment in the chemical industry, MINIST.ERE DE 
L'lNDUSTRIE, supra note 28, at 17-18. 
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eral outline of the new liberty in international finance and a suc-
cinct, clear guide to the powers of the government to impose limits 
on this freedom. 
Article I declared: "Financial relations between France and 
other countries are free," and article 2 went on to list the text of 
prior exchange control laws and decrees, all of which, together with 
their implementing regulations, were expressly revoked.42 It is clear, 
however, that this freedom was to be of the qualified, relative sort. 
Thus, article I goes on to say that "this liberty shall be exercised in 
the manner provided by the present law .... " Moreover, article 3 
in effect gave to the executive the power to re-enact by decree-but 
only in order to assure the defense of national interests-provisions 
highly similar in nature to the very exchange or investment controls 
that had just been abrogated. Thus, the government was empowered 
to: 
1° Submit to declaration, prior authorization or control: 
a) Exchange operations, capital movements, and payments of all 
kinds between France and other countries; 
b) The constitution, transformation of the nature of, and the liqui-
dation of French assets abroad; 
c) The constitution and the liquidation of foreign investments in 
France; 
d) The importation and exportation of gold as well as all other ma-
terial movements of securities between France and other coun-
tries; 
2° Provide for the repatriation of all credits existing abroad aris-
ing from the exportation of merchandise, the payment for services 
rendered, and in a general way, all foreign income or revenues; 
3° To empower intermediaries to affect the operations cited in 
paragraphs (a) and (d) above. 
The bill was considered by the Finance Committee of the Na-
tional Assembly and a report summarizing the purpose of the law 
was presented by the Committee shortly thereafter, on December 13, 
1966, through Louis Vallon, a prominent Gaullist deputy. In this 
report Michel Debre, Minister of Finance, commented on the new 
law as follows: 
The economic and financial recovery of the country and the new 
42. One of the complaints of practitioners has been that the list of the texts relating 
to exchange controls which have been repealed is by no means exhaustive, and there 
remains some question as to whether certain regulations which marginally touch upon 
exchange controls are still in effect. On this subject, see R. La Claviere, La Nouvelle 
Reglementation des Relations Financieres avec l'Etranger, (1967) Sem. Jur. I. 2071, at 
para. 53. Article 4 of the law provided that prior controls over exports, imports, and 
insurance were not repealed. They were, however, subsequently revised and relaxed by 
departmental regulation. Arr~te of the Minister of the Economy- and of Finance, Jan. 
30, 1967, (1967) J.O. 1108. 
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orientation of our economic policy arising, in particular from our 
international agreements, have already permitted a progressive re-
laxation of exchange controls. In many cases a regime of freedom has 
been re-established. In law, however, exchange controls remain, which 
is not without practical disadvantages. Administrative formalities 
remain numerous. Badly informed as to the present state of complex 
regulations, parties concerned often do not know whether or not 
they have committed an infraction. Finally, the maintenance of ex-
change controls seems scarcely compatible with the orientation of 
the Brussels negotiations. The return of the liberty of financial re-
lations with other countries must not, however, take away from the 
government all possibility of action. The French and European 
conception of liberty in this area must be more restricted than the 
American conception. The government must maintain a certain 
control over foreign investments in France or French investments 
abroad. It must also be able to reestablish controls in certain sectors 
if exceptional events justify them. The proposed text is not designed 
to permit the government to enlarge the scope of its interventions, 
but, on the contrary, to supply more clearly a new legal basis for 
these interventions.43 
The bill was passed by the National Assembly on December 14, 
1966, and adopted by the Senate with only minor modifications on 
December 16. On December 28, the bill was signed by the President 
of the Republic and became Law No. 66-1008.44 
The law gave the French government thirty days in which to 
take advantage of the provisions of article 3: if by January 31, 1967 
-the outside limit for the effective date of the Act-no such regu-
lations as provided for in article 3 had been promulgated, the finan-
cial relations between France and foreign nations would indeed have 
been entirely "free," for exchange controls having been abolished, 
no controls of any sort would have existed as to foreign investment 
in France. The two governmental decrees issued within the thirty-
day deadline established, however, an elaborate set of foreign in-
vestment controls producing a significant change of emphasis from 
the law's concept of freedom. 
B. Structure of the Enabling Decrees and Regulations 
Based upon the report of the Ministry of Finance on January 27, 
1967, the Prime Minister issued Decree No. 67-7845 prescribing the 
modes of application of the previously enacted law. The decree was 
43. Rapport No. 2253, Premiere Session Ordinaire, 1966-67, Annex to minutes of 
session of Dec. 13, 1967, at 33. 
44. Law No. 66-1008 of Dec. 28, 1966, [1966] J.O. 11621. 
45. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] J.O. 1073. 
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completed by departmental regulation (arrete) of the same date.46 
The loose draftsmanship of this regulation, which has raised myriad 
problems of interpretation, was thought by some to bear the marks 
of a haste necessitated by the thirty-day "statute of limitations." 
Decree No. 67-78 deals with most major aspects of international 
finance and investment, including investment abroad by French 
residents; this Article, however, will basically be limited to a detailed 
examination of the problem of foreign investment in France. 
The decree establishes three major categories of international 
investment and financing: 
I. Direct investments (investissements directs), as that term is de-
fined in the decree, in France by nonresidents (or investment 
abroad by French residents), which investments are subject to a 
declaration procedure before the Ministry of Finance and which 
may be blocked by the Ministry; 
2. Borrowings from abroad, within limits defined by the decree, by 
French residents, which borrowings are subject to specific prior 
authorization by the Ministry of Finance; and 
3. Investments not constituting "direct investments" as defined in 
the decree and foreign financing not specifically subject to the 
authorization procedure, neither of which are subject to govern-
mental control. 
The decree and arrete further require the specific prior autho-
rization by the Minister of Finance before public offerings on the 
French market of foreign securities will be permitted, 47 a special 
requirement which is not, however, substantially more rigorous than 
are the procedural requirements under French law for the public 
offering of French securities.48 Special provision is made for the 
importation and exportation of gold upon declarations with customs 
after prior report to the Bank of France.49 
Despite the abolition of exchange controls the decree and arrete 
provide for reporting by French residents to authorized intermedi-
aries, for statistical purposes, of all financial transactions abroad. 50 
The authorized intermediaries must, in turn, report these financial 
46. Arr~te of the Ministry of the Economy and of Finance, Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] J.O. 
1074. 
47. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 5, [1967] J.O. 1073. An exception is made 
for securities already listed on the "Bourse," and bonds which have been guaranteed 
by the French government. 
48. It may be, however, that authorization for sale of foreign securities will not be 
liberally granted in view of the capital requirements of the French market. See Brock, 
The Reform of French Exchange Controls, 22 Bus. LAw. 985 (1967). 
49. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 8, [1967] J.O. 1073. 
50. Id. art. 9; Arr~te of the Ministry of the Economy and of Finance, Jan. 27, 1967, 
art. 11, [1967] J.O. 1074. 
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transactions to the Bank of France, which has the power to request 
further information regarding the transactions in question. 
Alongside this mechanism of control of investments, but not 
pursuant to the authority of Law No. 66-1008, a separate system of 
control was established for the acquisition by French domiciliaries 
of industrial property rights, know-how, and technical assistance 
from foreign domiciliaries. This field had been previously governed 
by strict Ministry of Finance controls abolished by the new law; 
a separate Decree, No. 67-82,51 issued by the Prime Minister at the 
same time as the decrees on investment, now requires that contracts 
providing for such acquisitions be submitted to the Ministry of In-
dustry through a notification procedure (avis). 
Finally, arretes of the Ministry of Finance and of the Director of 
the Customs Service52 revoked all regulations relating to import and 
export promulgated pursuant to prior exchange control laws and 
decrees. Although a restricted number of transactions (such as ex-
portation of items on the forbidden strategic list) are still subject 
to prior authorization, the new procedures initiated by these arretes 
provide substantial liberty of trade. 
This collection of laws, decrees, and regulations spans the entire 
field of international trade and investment as dealt with by the pre-
vious French exchange control regulations. In contrast to prior law, 
however, that which is not expressly forbidden is now permitted; 
now, in order to block or delay an investment, the government must 
assume the burden of intervening and expressing its dissatisfaction 
with a proposed financing arrangement. But the fact remains that 
the new regime provides a wide-ranging mechanism for the surveil-
lance, control, and, if deemed necessary, the limitation of foreign 
investment and financing, a mechanism which, if routinely exploited, 
might well render the new law indistinguishable from the previous 
regime with its general limiting requirement of prior authorization. 
C. Declaration Procedure for "Direct Investments" 
The procedures for control of "direct investments" apply both 
to French investments abroad and foreign investments in France. 
With minor difference, the rules which apply to these two classes of 
investment are the same, and, unless noted otherwise, it may be as-
sumed that what is said here as to foreign investment in France 
also applies to French investment abroad.53 
51. Decree No. 67-82 of Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] J.O. 1081. 
52. Avis of the Ministry of the Economy and of Finance, Jan. 30, 1967, [1967] J.O. 
1127. 
53. No rationalization has been given for subjecting French investment abroad-
favored by government policy-to the declaration procedure. It does, however, provide 
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Unlike the old exchange controls, the present regulations do not 
require procurement of a government license, as such, to affect a 
foreign investment in France. However, nonresident individuals or 
companies must submit a declaration to the Ministry of Finance 
which details any proposed direct investment.54 In determining 
whether a person or company shall be considered as a resident or 
nonresident, the criterion applied by the decree is habitual residence 
(residence lzabituelle) for individuals and the location of the head 
office (le siege) for companies.55 For the purpose only of the regu-
lation of direct investments, French companies under foreign control 
are treated as foreign residents and foreign companies under French 
control are treated as French residents.56 Direct investments in or 
from a number of African countries, which are former members of 
the French Communaute and whose currency is tied to the French 
treasury, are exempted from the declaration procedure.57 
A nonresident is considered to make an investment in France, 
subject to declaration, when it acquires a direct investment from 
another nonresident. For example, if an American corporation 
wished to acquire from another American corporation all of the 
stock in its French subsidiary, such an acquisition would have to be 
submitted to the Ministry of Finance. The same would be true if a 
foreign corporation having a French subsidiary wishes to merge with 
another foreign corporation, as the merger would involve a French 
a kind of statutory reciprocity in the treatment of French and foreign investment. 
Furthermore, the habits of nearly thirty years of exchange control, and the concept of 
a controlled economy, militate toward making all foreign economic transactions sub-
ject to government veto. No instance of a veto of French investment abroad under 
the new regulations is presently known. 
54. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] J.O. 1073. 
55. Am~te of the Minister of Finance of July 15, 1947, tit. I, arts. 1-3, [1947] J.O. 
6993, sets forth the criteria of habitual residence found in prior law. Nonetheless, 
departmental regulations had established a rule of thumb that a foreigner would not 
ordinarily acquire a French residence, nor a French citizen a foreign residence, without 
two years of effective residence. Avis No. 767 of March 19, 1964, [1964] J.O. 2572. It 
would appear that under the new law French residence can be claimed as soon as any 
documentary evidence, notably a French residence and "carte de sejour" have been 
acquired. It should be noted that "France" is defined in art. 2 of Decree No. 67-78 of 
Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] J.O. 1073, to include metropolitan France, Corsica, France's over-
seas departments (Guadeloupe, Guiana, Martinique, and Reunion), the overseas terri-
tories other than the French Somali Coast (Comores, New Caledonia and dependencies, 
Wallis, and Futuna, French Polynesia, St.-Pierre and Miquelon), and the Principality 
of Monaco. 
56. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, arts. 3-l(b), 4-1, [1967] J.O. 1073. See also discus-
sion of companies under foreign control in text accompanying note 95 infra and 
passim. 
57. Id. art. 7 which exempts from the declaration procedure relations with countries 
"dont l'institut d't!mission est lit! au Tresor franfais par une convention de compte 
d'opt!rations." These countries are presently: The Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Niger, Sene-
gal, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Congo, Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, Togo, 
Cameroun, and Madagascar. 
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direct investment by the acquiring corporation. The old exchange 
controls law did not affect such transactions, which, as there was no 
exchange of foreign currencies, were not subject to Ministry of 
Finance authorization. 
The declaration is made by letter, or preferably on the form 
supplied by the government. The procedure following this first step 
is then described by the decree: 
During a period of two months following the reception of the 
declaration, the Minister of Finance may request the postponement 
[ajournement] of the operations contemplated. He may, nevertheless, 
prior to the expiration of the two months period, renounce his right 
to request postponement.58 
Although a study of the text alone does not immediately reveal 
the consequence of a postponement, in fact the Ministry of Finance 
has the legal power to play the same role that it played under the 
authorization procedure of the old exchange control regulations. 
The Ministry may request temporary postponement (ajournement 
provisoire) of the investment in order to allow time for further 
study or to permit the applicant to modify its application along the 
lines suggested by the government. If the investment is considered 
unsatisfactory, and if the applicant is unwilling or unable to modify 
its application to meet government objections, a permanent post-
ponement (ajournement definitif) may be anticipated. Such an 
action would, in practice, only be taken upon the personal deter-
mination of the Minister himself. The primary difference between 
the present and prior procedures is that if no action is now taken 
by the government within sixty days of the receipt of the declaration, 
the investment is automatically acceptable. 
Article 4 of the decree also provides for declaration by a foreign 
resident (or by a French company under foreign control) of the 
liquidation of any direct investment. However, the decree does not 
specifically provide that the Minister of Finance has the right to 
request postponement in such a case, and the regulations provide, 
in fact, that declaration of the liquidation of an investment must be 
made within twenty days after the termination of the operation.119 
D. "Direct Investment" Defined 
Article 2(3) of the decree supplies the key definition of "direct 
investments": 
58. Id. art. 4-1. 
59. Arrete of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, Jan. 27, 1967, art. 4, [1967] 
J.O. 1074. Article 4 of the decree provides that the declaration of the liquidation may 
be dispensed with when stock in a French corporation is transferred between foreign 
residents after a declaration of investment, subject to the postponement procedure, 
has been made by the transferee. 
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(a) The purchase, the creation or the extension of any business 
[fonds de commerce], branch or individual enterprise. 
(b) All other operations which alone or together with others con-
currently or consecutively, have the effect of permitting a person 
or persons to acquire or increase the control of a company en-
gaged in industrial, agricultural, commercial, financial or realty 
operations, whatever may be its form, or to assure the expansion 
[extension] of such company already controlled by them. 
However, the sole acquisition of a participation not exceeding 
20% of the capital of a company quoted on the stock exchange 
shall in no case be considered as a direct investment. 
Subparagraph (a) of article 2(3) deals primarily with the creation 
or acquisition of personal enterprises or business not organized in 
the form of companies. Such creation or acquisition on behalf of a 
nonresident is subject to the declaration procedure. It is noteworthy, 
moreover, that the creation of a branch (succursale) is specifically 
defined as direct investment and hence is in all cases subject to the 
declaration procedure. By contrast, prior exchange controls did not 
require prior authorization for the opening of a branch if no for-
eign investment was necessary for its creation. 
Subparagraph (b) of article 2(3) deals with direct investment in 
companies (societes). The term "societe" includes every type of 
societe which may be formed under the French Company Law of 
July 24, 1966.60 These include commercial companies such as the 
corporation (societe anonyme), the limited liability company (societe 
a responsabilite limitee), and the limited partnership (societe en 
nom collectif). Article 2(3)(b) also appears to include civil com-
panies as provided for under articles 1832-34 of the Civil Code, and 
in particular civil companies formed for realty exploitation (societes 
civiles immobilieres). In this context, it is interesting to note that 
prior law permitted investment by nonresidents in such societes 
civiles immobilieres without intervention by the Ministry of Fi-
nance as long as payment of the purchase price was arranged through 
a notaire.61 By including the heretofore substantial foreign invest-
ments in this type of French realty company, the new law may well 
exert a significant practical effect. 
As defined in article 2(3)(b), an investment is a direct investment 
and hence subject to the declaration procedure if the investor ac-
quires control of a French company; or increases its pre-existing con-
trol of a French company; or finances the expansion of a company 
already under its control. 
60. Law No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 6402. 
61. See Avis No. 767 of March 19, 1964, [1964] J.O. 2572; Note No. 498 of the Di-
rector of Foreign Finances, March 19, 1964. 
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What constitutes control? The decree is silent as to this. Yet this 
determination is a familiar corporate law exercise, in France as well 
as in the United States; it is a question of fact not adapted to precise 
definition. It seems certain, consequently, that the failure to define 
the term was intentional. It would, of course, be impossible to enu-
merate all of the factual circumstances which would constitute 
control-clearly it can be acquired by devices other than stock own-
ership-and an attempt to draft a comprehensive text would only 
lead to loopholes and abuses. 62 Therefore, the French lawmakers, 
utilizing a technique often seen in the United States, left the term 
without statutory definition.63 
Perhaps some guidelines do exist, however, since French courts 
have defined foreign control of a French company. The issue arose 
under World War I laws providing for the sequestration of French 
companies under enemy control, and the test was said to be whether 
"the management or capital are knmvn to be in totality or in major 
part in the hands of the enemy subjects."64 The courts have applied 
these criteria to various fact situations,65 and their approach appears 
to indicate that they would determine the factual issue of control 
in the same way as an American court in like circumstances. 
The percentage of capital ownership constituting control is 
likely to vary according to the situation of the company and the pro-
visions of its bylaws, depending, for example, upon whether or not 
the company is closely held or whether the shares are in nominative 
or bearer form. One thing seems relatively clear. If the notion of 
control is to make any sense at all, no shareholder or group of share-
holders may be held to have acquired control of a French company, 
whatever his or its percentage of stock ownership, if another share-
62. It is interesting to note, however, that a number of French treaties attempt to 
define control. See, e.g., the Franco-Algerian Convention of August 28, 1962, dealing 
with the exploitation of minerals in the Sahara and defining control of a company. 
Control will be considered to be exercised by French persons or companies-when 
non-French persons of companies do not hold, either directly or indirectly, a 
determining power in the direction and management of the enterprise, either by 
the possession of more than one-half of the votes of the shares of the company, 
or by any other means. 
Decree No. 62-1020, Convention for the Application of para. 8 of tit. I of the Declara-
tion of Principles Concerning Cooperation in the Exploitation of Sub-Saharan Wealth, 
art. 6, [1962] J.O. 577. 
63. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aa to h-1 (1964), the 
legislative history of which clearly indicates that it was thought undesirable to attempt 
to define the term "control." H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934), quoted 
in 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 772 (2d ed. 1962). 
64. Regulations of the Ministry of Justice of Feb. 29, 1916, [1916] J.O. 1658, [1916] 
J. DROIT lNT'L 701. 
65. See, e.g., Widow Reifenberg, [1923] J. DROIT INT'L 322 (Cass. req.); for a fuller 
description of the sequestration cases-, see H. BATIIFOL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt 
227-34 (4th ed. 1967). 
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holder or group of shareholders enjoys a dominant influence in the 
actual management and direction of the company. Unfortunately 
for the practitioner, however, it is impossible to be more precise than 
this. 
The only guide provided by the decree itself as to the percentage 
of stock ownership that might amount to control is the provision of 
article 3 stating that in no event will the sole acquisition of less than 
twenty per cent of the stock of a company quoted on the French 
stock exchange constitute a direct investment.66 By inference, there-
fore, there is no assumption of control in such an acquisition. This 
provision is designed to permit portfolio investments without sub-
mission to Ministry of Finance regulations. The percentage was in-
tentionally set low to guard against the possibility that a relatively 
small holding of shares in a large publicly owned corporation might 
carry control with it. It is submitted, however, that this exception 
can in no logical way be read to imply the converse proposition: that 
the mmership of twenty per cent or more of the capital of a company 
not quoted on the exchange does constitute control. Nonetheless, 
some knowledgeable French officials seem to have inferred such a 
conclusion, at least as a rule of thumb.67 
Factors other than the percentage of capital mvnership must also 
be considered in resolving the factual issue of control. These other 
factors68 include the following elements listed by the Ministry of 
Finance in its notice regarding declarations of direct investments: 
loans or debt instruments held by the investor, real property rights, 
leases and mining rights, technical assistance agreements, and li-
censes of industrial property rights. 69 In theory, these factors alone, 
without any capital mmership, could constitute an acquisition of 
control. In the ordinary case, however, such agreements would be 
66. Under prior law, acquisitions of stock listed on the stock exchange could be 
engaged in without specific authorization by the Ministry of Finance only if purchased 
at the price quoted on the exchange. Apparently under the new controls acquisition 
of up to twenty per cent of the stock of a listed company may be made at any price, 
without the necessity of making a declaration. 
67. The only investments subject to declaration are those giving control over a 
French company to a non-resident. As a rule, participations of less than 20% of 
the capital arc not considered as giving a controlling interest; conversely partici-
pations of more than 20% arc considered as giving such control. But there may be 
exceptions: what is important is the notion of a controUing interest and not the 
actual percentage. 
Larre, The Liberalization of French Exchange Controls: A Step Toward More Freedom 
of Movement of Capital, FRENCH AM. COMMERCE 18, 19 (March-April 1967). 
68. See Pinto, Le Regime ]uridique des Investissements Etrangers en France, [1967] 
J. DROIT INT'L 235, 248. 
69. Notice of the Ministry of the Economy and of Finance Regarding Declarations 
of Direct Investments Made in France, April 18, 1967. 
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held to constitute an acquisition or increase of control only in con-
junction with a certain degree of capital ownership. 
Article 2 of the decree provides that a nonresident makes a direct 
investment requiring a declaration not only by acquiring control of 
a French enterprise but also by increasing pre-existing control or 
expanding the activities of a French company already under control. 
An increase in control may be accomplished either by increasing 
capital participation, giving the controlling shareholder a higher per-
centage in the equity, or by any of the other methods mentioned 
above. Loans must also be scrutinized if either the terms or the 
amounts are unusual, lest they give the lender additional influence 
in the control of the borrowing company. If taken literally, the text 
of the decree would appear to require resort to the declaration pro-
cedure even when the foreign shareholder merely purchases an 
additional one or two shares of the controlled company, but a more 
intelligent interpretation would require declaration of only those 
increases in control which have some practical significance. 
The notion of expansion (extension) of a controlled French 
company raises certain difficulties. It would be entirely reasonable 
to define such expansion as including only the addition of new ac-
tivities not included in the original corporate purposes or not previ-
ously exploited by the company;70 under this definition, foreign 
prorata participation in the increase of the capital of a controlled 
corporation ( or loans to such a company) for the purpose of increas-
ing production or adding to the existing means of production would 
not constitute a direct investment. However, early indications from 
government representatives seem to indicate that a much broader 
interpretation of the term "extension" is to be applied, so as to 
include mere increases in the size of the company, particularly in 
productive capacity and purchase of new plant, equipment, and 
assets. Under this definition, additional financing of a controlled 
company could escape the declaration procedure only if its purpose 
were to meet the requirements of current day to day operations. 
Since a capital increase, by its nature, implies long-term expan-
sion, investment by way of subscription to an increase of capital of 
a controlled company is, as a general rule, subject to control proce-
dures even though all shareholders retain the same percentage of 
stock ownership. However, where the purpose of the capital increase 
is to refinance an existing debt structure, there is no expansion. 
Furthermore, the arrete specifically provides that increasing capital 
70. Pinto, supra note 68, at 249. 
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out of undistributed profit is not subject to declaration procedures.71 
When an investment is made by way of loans to a controlled com-
pany, the presumption is that this does not constitute an extension 
and that the investment regulations are not applicable. Loans are the 
businessman's usual way of assuring the financing of current opera-
tions. This presumption is rebutted, however, when loans are used 
to assure long-range expansion, the addition of productive capacity, 
or the financing of new ventures. Of course, when a loan financing 
the expansion of a controlled company does in fact constitute a 
direct investment, it is subject to the normal declaration procedures 
rather than the special authorization procedure applicable to for-
eign loans. 
Determination of whether a given financing is a direct invest-
ment or just a loan poses perhaps the principal problem in the inter-
pretation of the new foreign investment regime. When in doubt, the 
investor may always confer informally with the Ministry of Finance 
to obtain the advice of the civil servants concerned. 
E. Prior Authorization Procedure for Foreign Loans 
Section IV of the decree provides that all borrowings by individ-
uals or companies resident in France from international institutions 
or from individuals or companies resident abroad are subject to the 
prior authorization (autorisation prealable) of the Ministry of 
Finance. There is no parallel requirement for loans by French resi-
dents to foreign borrowers. In contrast to the provisions controlling 
direct investment, foreign-controlled French companies and French 
branches of foreign companies are treated as French residents and 
thus must also seek authorization if they borrow from foreign 
sources.72 
The mechanism is precisely the same as that provided by the old 
exchange control law, and should be contrasted with the new decla-
ration procedure for direct investments. An application is made to 
the Ministry of Finance, and the operation may not be undertaken 
until authorization has been granted. Although there is no fixed 
period of time within which the Ministry of Finance must make its 
decision, in fact the ministry may generally be expected to act within 
a two-month period. 
Section IV of the decree, however, exempts two categories of 
financing from the prior authorization procedure: loans which con-
71. Arr~te of the Ministry of the Economy and of Finance of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 
3(3) [1967] J.O. 1074. 
72. Foreign branches of French companies are treated as foreign residents. 
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stitute direct investments, and loans which meet restrictive criteria 
supplied by the decree. I£ a foreign loan is a device to acquire con-
trol of a French company, to increase a pre-existing prior control, or 
to assure the expansion of a company already under foreign control, 
and is therefore a direct investment, the declaration procedures apply 
rather than the prior authorization procedures. In practice, the for-
eign parent company engaged in financing a French subsidiary is 
most likely to be affected by this provision. In each case, a judgment 
will have to be made whether the loan is to be considered as financing 
an expansion of the subsidiary or as merely taking the place of rou-
tine financing of current operations which ordinarily would be avail-
able from local financing institutions. In the case of an already wholly 
owned French subsidiary, 73 it is difficult to see how there could 
be a further increase of the parent's control such as to make the dec-
laration procedure applicable (assuming no expansion of the sub-
sidiary's actual operations). While one can conceive of one hundred 
per cent equity control being increased by further control as a cred-
itor, it is suggested that the French government already having been 
consulted, and having interposed no objection to foreign shareholder 
domination of the company, should have no interest in applying, as 
to loans by the foreign parent, the special declaration procedures 
designed to prevent uncontrolled foreign takeovers. In such circum-
stances, consequently, the loan should not be subject to the declara-
tion procedure; depending upon the amount involved, it would 
either be subject to the prior authorization procedure of section IV, 
or it would be free from all formalities. Where, on the other hand, 
ownership of the corporation is split between a minority shareholder 
group and the majority shareholder, it is, of course, easy to see how 
a loan by the majority shareholder to its subsidiary could serve to 
increase its control, thus constituting a direct investment subject to 
the declaraion procedure. This could be true even where the major-
ity shareholder did not make the loan itself, but merely guaranteed 
a loan by a foreign bank to the French company. 
A more delicate question arises where a loan to a foreign-con-
trolled French company by a local bank in France is guaranteed by 
the foreign parent company. It is submitted that such a loan, taking 
place between two resident French companies, would not be subject 
to the prior authorization procedure. Since the French banking insti-
73. Although many French subsidiaries are considered to be "wholly owned" by 
foreign parent companies, the parent never owns one hundred per cent of the out-
standing stock since French company law requires that there be a minimum of seven 
shareholders and that each director owns a number of shares of company stock speci-
fied in the articles of incorporation and bylaws. 
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tution would already be subject to all the applicable credit controls 
of internal French law,74 there would be no need to add the autho-
rization procedure appropriate to foreign loans. On the other hand, 
if the loan served to increase or extend a foreign shareholder's con-
trol, then the foreign shareholder would have participated in a direct 
investment and would have to make a declaration.715 
Two types of loans are exempted from the prior authorization 
procedure and may be contracted freely: (a) loans from abroad to 
finance services rendered abroad or commercial transactions between 
France and foreign countries, 76 and (b) loans from abroad as long as 
the borrower does not have a cumulative total of more than two mil-
lion francs (about $400,000) of such loans outstanding.77 The former 
exception is intended to recognize the necessities of normal interna-
tional trade; the latter represents a considerable relaxation from 
prior rules which permitted French companies to contract foreign 
loans up to a cumulative total of one million francs without prior 
authorization, but only on condition that the loan did not exceed 
two years in duration and the maximum rate of interest did not 
exceed four per cent.78 It should be stressed, however, that even loans 
which do not cause the borrower's foreign indebtedness to exceed 
the two million franc ceiling, will be subject to the declaration pro-
cedure if they constitute a direct investment.79 
F. Criminal Penalties 
Article 5 of the new law provides criminal penalties for violation 
of the law, as well as for violation of those decrees issued in conform-
ity with article 3 of the law. The penalties include imprisonment from 
one to three months, confiscation of the corpus delicti, and imposi-
tion of a fine of at least one-half, but not more than twice, the 
amount of the infraction. No other sanctions are provided. 
Enforcement of economic regulations by criminal sanctions is 
74. These arc established by the Conseil National des Credit and arc obligatory on 
banks in France, whether domestic or branches of foreign banks. 
75. l\Iany such loans arc financed by French branches of foreign (frequently Amer-
ican) banks. The branch is considered as a French resident for these purposes and it 
need in no event request authorization. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, § II, art 6(3), 
[1967) J.O. 1023. If such a bank operated as an investment bank, and acquired control 
of French companies, however, it would presumably be subject to investment proce-
dures. 
76. Id. § IV, art. 6(2). 
77. Id. § IV, art. 6(4). 
78. Avis No. 762 of the Ministry of the Economy and of Finance, Aug. 7, 1963, 
tit. I, [1963) J.O. 7340, replacing Avis No. 669 of the Ministry of the Economy and of 
Finance of Jan. 21, 1959, tit. l(A)(5)(b), [1959) J.O. 1130. 
79. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, § IV, art. 6(1), [1967) J.O. 1073, 
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not particularly surprising, but the vagueness of the regulatory cri-
teria could well lead to inequities. A leading member of the Paris 
bar has commented that the vagueness of such key concepts as "con-
trol" abandons the definition to "the discretion of the administra-
tion at first and the criminal court afterwards."80 One might guess 
that in practice most prudent businessmen will avoid possible crim-
inal penalties by complying with the procedures set forth in the 
regulations, as interpreted by the administration in the informal 
conferences mentioned above, even in those cases where it is ex-
tremely doubtful that a court would find the regulations applicable. 
In the absence of judicial interpretation, the interpretation urged 
by the administration will be accepted. This was already the estab-
lished practice under prior law.81 
It should be noted that this is not solely a French phenomenon: 
distortions in the interpretation of economic regulations brought 
about the threat of criminal prosecutions and by the absence of 
judicial interpretation in noncriminal cases has been noted and 
criticized in regard to the enforcement of American regulatory 
legislation.82 The complexity of the regulations under United States 
statutes, such as the Export Control Act, 83 which are also enforced by 
criminal sanctions, has given rise to a similar pattern of informal 
consultations with the concerned agency and usual acceptance of its 
interpretation. 
The provisions for institution of criminal proceedings84 appear 
to leave considerable discretion with the Minister of Finance in the 
commencement and settlement of actions based on violations of in-
vestment controls. Thus, although little flexibility in the prosecution 
of criminal violations of the new law is evident from its text, in 
practice, such flexibility will probably exist. 
G. Industrial Property Rights and Know-How 
Control by the Minister of Finance over agreements with foreign 
residents relating to industrial property rights, know-how, and tech-
nical assistance, traditionally exercised within the scope of exchange 
80. Monneray, Le Nouveau Regime des Changes et des Investissements Etrangers, 
Le Monde, Feb. 5·6, 1967, at 9, col. 2. 
81. Jeantet, Exchange and Control Regulations in France in 1 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET 197, 224 (E. Stein&: T. Nicholson eds. 1960). 
82. Austern, Sanctions in Silhouette: An Inquiry Into the Enforcement of the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 51 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 38 (1963). 
83. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021-32 (1964). The regulations are found at 15 C.F.R. § 368-99 
(1967). 
84. Law No. 66-1008 of Dec. 28, 1966, art. 5(ll), [1966] J.O. 11621 (incorporating by 
reference provisions of the Customs Code giving the Minister of Finance discretionary 
powers in the institution of proceedings). 
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controls, was terminated with the abolition of those controls by 
Law No. 66-1008. The law made no provision for new controls in 
this area. However, a decree transferred responsibility to the Min-
ister of Industry and empowered him to give an avis, or opinion, on 
such agreements.85 While this decree was issued on the same day as 
the Ministry of Finance decree implementing Law No. 66-1008, it is 
not based upon that law and makes no reference to it.86 It differs 
in a number of significant ways from the Ministry of Finance reg-
ulations. 
Unlike the regulations providing for control both over French 
investments abroad and foreign investment in France, the Ministry 
of Industry decree applies only to the acquisition by French domi-
ciliaries of industrial property rights, know-how, and technical assis-
tance from abroad. The unilateral nature of the control illustrates 
a French policy decision that the primary concern of the government 
is to protect French industry against such weakening or stagnation of 
its technical competence as might arise through excessive reliance 
and expenditure on foreign industrial property rights and tech-
niques. 
The decree provides that the French domiciliary shall deposit the 
proposed agreement, together with a dossier of supporting documents 
and explanations, with the Ministry.87 Within forty days after the 
completed dossier has been received, the Ministry must render a 
favorable or unfavorable opinion on the agreement. The Ministry's 
examination spans the technical and financial terms of the agreement 
and takes into account national defense requirements, if applicable.88 
It may consult with the contracting party to determine whether 
available French resources have been utilized and may propose and 
discuss modifications of the agreement. Presumably, it can refuse to 
render a favorable opinion if proposed modifications are not ac-
cepted. 89 
Since the Ministry of Industry decree is not based on the new 
85. Decree No. 67-82 of Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] J.O. 1081. The decree was later im-
plemented by departmental regulation. Arrete of the Ministry of Industry, March 6, 
1967, [1967] J.O. 3173. 
86. The only authority cited in the decree is Decree No. 65-586 of July 15, 1965, 
[1965] J.O. 6215, relating to the organization of the Ministry of Industry. 
87. Unlike Decree No. 67-78, [1967] J.O. 1073, which uses the test of habitual resi-
dence, Decree No. 67-82, art. 1, [1967] J.O. 1080, refers to contracts between persons 
domiciled in France and persons domiciled abroad. The reason for this differentia-
tion is not apparent. 
88. Arrcte of the Ministry of Industry, March 6, 1967, arts. 1, 3, n.64, [1967] J.O. 
3173. 
89. Decree No. 67-82 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 2, [1967] J.O. 1081. In the opinion of 
one writer the contracting party need only consider the technical suggestions of the 
Ministry and is not obliged to accept these or any other modifications. See Pinto, supra 
note 68, at 260-61. 
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law governing foreign investments, the effect of an unfavorable 
opinion rendered by the Ministry is uncertain. It is quite clear that 
the criminal penalties of Law No. 66-1008 are not applicable.0° Fur-
thermore, as the decree itself imposes no penalties, criminal or other-
wise, it may be argued that even if the parties disregard the opinion 
of the Ministry, the contract would nevertheless remain valid.91 
Notwithstanding this apparent lack of enforcement remedies, the 
departmental arrete, issued by the Ministry of Industry on March 6, 
1967, to complete the provisions of the January decree, provides that 
the decision of the Ministry will be communicated to the ta.x 
authorities and to customs authorities.92 This raises the possibility 
that indirect pressures may be applied to coerce compliance with 
the Ministry's proposals. To pose one possibility, deductions taken 
by a licensee for royalty payments under a license which had received 
an unfavorable opinion by the Ministry might well be disallowed by 
the tax authorities. Thus, while it is doubtful that legal authority 
exists for the taking of prejudicial tax or customs action based solely 
on the unfavorable opinion of the Ministry regarding a licensing 
agreement, it may be expected that the mere expression of an official 
opinion as to the undesirability of an agreement, together with the 
communication of this opinion to the interested agencies, will dis-
suade the parties from putting their agreement into effect without 
inclusion of the Ministry's "suggestions." 
The other principal requirement contained in the Ministry of 
Industry decree is that of making annual reports of receipts and 
expenses under agreements covered by the decree.93 Since the only 
contracts covered by such agreements are those which would gen-
erally call for payments, but not receipts, by the French party, the 
reason for requiring the latter in the annual report is unclear. It 
seems quite probable that the language was drafted in expectation 
that the decree would be bilateral in nature. In fact, a later circular 
of the Ministry of Industry, while recognizing that there is no obliga-
tion to do so, has requested that contracts transferring or licensing 
industrial property rights abroad should likewise be filed with the 
Ministry.94 Indeed, the Ministry of Industry has in some cases 
formally requested reports as to the receipts by the French contract-
90. See Monneray, supra note 80, at 12. Professor Pinto is also of the same opinion. 
Pinto, supra note 68, at 263. 
91. Pinto, supra note 68, at 263. 
92. Arrete of the Ministry of Industry, March 6, 1967, art. 6, [1967] J.O. 3173. 
93. Decree No. 67-82 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 3, [1967] J.O. 1081; Arrete of the 
Ministry of Industry, March 6, 1967, art. 8, [1967] J.O. 3173. 
94. Ministry of Industry Circular, April 13, 1967, at 2. 
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ing party from foreign licensing agreements, maintaining its request 
despite objection by the party. As there would appear to be no pres-
ent legal basis for such requests, it may be expected that further 
regulations will be issued, or that administrative practice will be 
conformed to the contents of the present regulations. 
IV. THE NEW LEGAL REGIME OF FRENCH COMPANIES 
UNDER FOREIGN CONTROL 
The most important novelty in the new foreign investment 
regulations is the discriminatory legal treatment of French compan-
ies under foreign control. A French company under foreign control 
must make a declaration of all intended direct investments in France 
and such investments are subject to the refusal of the Ministry of 
Finance. Similar investments by French-owned French companies 
are, of course, free of such obligations. 
Prior law, based as it was on the control of foreign exchange, 
imposed barriers only on the original investment from abroad. Once 
a subsidiary had been established or control of an existing company 
had been acquired by the investment of foreign capital, the sub-
sidiary's subsequent dealings in France were not subject to regula-
tion. A company established under French law and having its head 
office in France was considered to be French and was treated as a 
resident.!16 
The mechanism for applying the new restrictions is found in 
article 4(1) of the Ministry of Finance decree, which states that the 
declaration procedure is applicable to direct investments made by 
companies in France under foreign control ("societes en France sous 
controle etranger"). If the framework of the decree and the teaching 
of prior exchange control law, both of which are based on the con-
cept of residence, are to be respected, the phrase "foreign control" 
must be read to refer to companies in France under control of per-
sons resident abroad. Article 3(l)(b) of the decree, relating to the 
corollary situation of investment by French-controlled companies 
abroad, more clearly refers to French residence, requiring declara-
tion of direct investments abroad by companies under the control 
of persons in France ("sous controle de personnes en France"). Basing 
his argument on the difference in language between article 4(1) and 
95. Avis No. 619 of Sept. 18, 1956, [1956] J.O. 8817. See also the definition supplied 
by the "Office des Changes" in response to a questionnaire: "La legislation des changes 
considere comme franraises les societes constitutees suivant la loi franraise et dont le 
siege social est situe en France. C'est le critere du siege social qui a ete adopte pour 
l'assujetissement a la legislation des changes." J. HAMEL, LE CoNTROLE DES CHANGES 
191 (1955). 
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article 3(1)(b), Professor Pinto, in his interesting article on the new 
law, has stated that the decree intends to utilize the test of national-
ity and not of residence in determining what constitutes "foreign 
control" of companies in France.96 Such an interpretation would be 
inconsistent with the residence test set up by article 4(1) in defining 
the flow of foreign capital into first tier investments in France sub-
ject to the declaration procedure. Thus, the substitution of a na-
tionality test in determining those second tier investments (invest-
ments in France by a foreign-controlled French company) subject 
to the declaration procedure does not seem to be required by the 
decree's language or its purposes.97 
The residence test, which is quite clearly adopted in referring to 
direct investments abroad by foreign companies under control of 
persons in France, does cause certain anomalies in extreme cases. 
Thus, for example, a Delaware corporation mmed by a French citi-
zen resident in the United States would be free to make direct invest-
ments in the United States without first making a declaration to the 
Ministry of Finance. If, however, the owner resided in France, the 
very same investment would be subject to the declaration procedure. 
Even more bizarre would be the case of a Delaware corporation 
owned by an American citizen resident in France. Following the test 
of article 3(l)(b), this American firm would be sous controle de per-
sonnes en France and would, consequently, be subject to the declara-
tion procedures even if it made a direct investment in the United 
States having no relationship with France-as, for example, the 
establishment of a United States subsidiary or branch, or the acqui-
sition of the assets of another United States business. In view of the 
seeming lack of French jurisdiction, or legislative interest, in such 
exclusively American affairs, it is doubtful whether such a result is 
intended. 
The practical effect of subjecting French companies under for-
eign control to the investment regulations is that a foreign-con-
trolled subsidiary may not itself acquire a French company or even 
increase its control over its own subsidiary without the blessing of 
the Ministry of Finance. Nor may it set up branch offices or acquire 
a fonds de commerce, or business concern, without Ministry ap-
proval. This prohibition would seem to bring under governmental 
control a rather broad range of activities. Any time that a foreign-
controlled French company in a service industry (for example, the 
96. Pinto, supra note 68, at 252. 
97. Accord R. &: J. LEFEBVRE, LE NOUVEAU REGIME DES RELATIONS FINANCIERS ENTRE 
LA FRANCE ET L'ETRANGER 12-13 (Mimeo 1967). 
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automatic car wash or laundromat industries) wishes to open a new 
operation to exploit a new clientele, it appears that a new declara-
tion will have to be made to the Ministry. The same would be true 
for the establishment of additional sales points by any sales organiza-
tion. Finally, the notion of "fonds de commerce" (roughly translated 
as a business or "going concern") is sufficiently broad to cause uncer-
tainty as to whether investment regulations apply in a wide variety 
of situations, such as the purchase of premises or the purchase of a 
commercial lease or assets of another company. The practitioner 
faced with the problem of determining whether a particular trans-
action will be deemed to involve a fonds de commerce for investment 
purposes should, perhaps, refer to the definitions of this well-devel-
oped concept in French tax law. 
Another effect of requiring French subsidiaries to declare direct 
investments-in view of the very broad scope of the term-is seem-
ingly to subject self-financed expansion to government control.98 
The typical case is where a foreign-controlled French subsidiary 
builds a new plant for new activities, raising the money by itself 
borrowing from French sources. While the commentators hesitate 
to conclude that such a transaction is subject to the control proce-
dures,99 and indeed a close reading of the decree permits the argu-
ment that the situation is not covered, 100 indications from informed 
sources are that government authorities would subject such expan-
sion activity to control.101 
While the new regulations constitute a profound change in the 
treatment of companies owned by foreign capital, the argument that 
they further constitute a profound modification of the French theory 
of nationality of companies is less supportable.102 While French case 
law has flirted from time to time with the notion of control as a test 
of nationality, 103 the accepted theory is that certain restricted statu-
98. Brock, supra note 48, at 988. 
99. Pinto, supra note 68, at 250. 
100. Article 4(1) of Decree No. 67-68, [1967] J.O. 1073, provides that a declaration 
must be filed for any direct investment made by foreign residents or by a French 
company under foreign control. However, in the case of "extension" art. 2(3)(b) 
defines direct investment as: "All other operations which ••• tend to permit one 
or several persons • • • to insure the extension of a company already under their 
control." (Emphasis added.) It can be argued that in the case of local financing no 
declaration need be filed by the foreign parent which has engaged in no investment 
activity, nor need it be filed by the subsidiary which has not engaged in an operation 
to insure the "extension" of a company already under its control. 
101. A specific exception is made in the case of an increase in capital from re• 
tained earnings of the French company, which is not subject to declaration. Arrete of 
the Ministry of the Economy and of Finance, Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] J.O. 1073. 
102. La Claviere, La Nouvelle Reglementation des Relations Financieres avec 
l'Entranger, [1967] Sem. Jur. I. 2071, at para. 28. 
103. See, e.g., Remington Typewriter, [1936] D.P. I. 121 (Cass. req.). 
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tory discriminations against French corporations mvned by foreign 
shareholders do not change the French nationality of companies 
having their siege in France.104 The new regulations would seem to 
conform to this principle. Their main novelty is that in the past spe-
cial treatment of French corporations controlled by foreign share-
holders has either been exceptional (such as the seizure of companies 
under enemy control as a war measure),105 in the nature of denial 
of special government benefits,106 or in support of national secu-
rity;107 the new rules, however, seem to provide for surveillance in 
France of French companies controlled by foreign residents as a 
permanent measure and as part of a general control of the role of 
foreigners in the domestic economy. 
V. ADMINISTRATION OF THE NEW LAW-
PROCEDURE AND POLICY 
A. The Elements of Decision 
The preceding study of the new foreign investment law and 
regulations leaves little doubt that the structure for rigid control of 
foreign direct investment in France now exists. The use the govern-
ment will make of the available controls is not, however, fully 
known. The first indications are, perhaps, contained in the informa-
tion which the administration demands from foreigners intending 
to effect direct investments in France, the information upon which, 
presumably, the administration's decision will be based. The sug-
gested contents of the declaration of direct investment are set forth 
in a notice issued by the Ministry of Finance.108 While this notice 
does not have the force of law, it does represent the point of view of 
the governmental agency in charge of foreign investments; conse-
quently, substantial compliance with it is both expected and in the 
interest of the potential investor. 
104. See H . .BATTIFOL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 231 (4th ed. 1967). 
105. Id. at 228. 
106. J.J. Rozendael Co. v. Minister of Public Works, [1933] D.H. Jur. 489 (Cass. civ.) 
(government award of war damages). 
107. Decree of August 17, 1936, [1936] J.O. 8888 (requiring at least half of the 
capital in defense industry corporations to be owned by French nationals); other 
legislation provides that the management or board of directors must be French, see 
Law of May 31, 1924, [1924] J.O. 5046 (companies engaged in air transportation); 
Law of April 7, 1902, art. 7, [1902) J.O. 2626 (subsidies for merchant marine). 
108. Ministere de !'Economic et des Finances, Direction du Tresor, Notice relative 
aux conditions d'etablissement des declarations prealables d'investissements directs 
operes en France par des personnes physiques ou morales a l'etranger ou par des 
entreprises ou societes en France sous controle etranger (April 1967), published in RE-
cuEIL pES TEXTES DU MINISTERE DE L'ECONOMIE ET DES FINANCES, INVESTISSEMENT I (1967). 
The Notice is accompanied by a printed form upon which the declaration of direct 
investment may be made. 
February 1968] Foreign Investment in France 697 
The first category of information concerns the investor himself. 
Nationality of an individual investor must be specified. For a cor-
poration, not only is the address of the head office demanded, but 
also the identity of its principal shareholders and their respective 
percentage shares of ownership of the company. The administration 
thus is interested less in the legal nationality of a corporation than 
in the nationality of the controlling shareholders. Certainly an in-
vestment made by the Belgian subsidiary of an American company 
will be considered as an American, and not a Belgian, investment. 
Financial information as to the investing corporation must also be 
made known, including its stated capital and its annual financial 
statements for the past three years. I£ the company is itself a sub-
sidiary or part of a related group of companies, some information 
as to the related companies is also required. Finally, technical and 
trade information regarding the investor must be supplied: the na-
ture of its activities, its volume of trade by product, its investment 
in plant and equipment, and its distribution arrangements. As a 
practical matter, it is frequently best to supplement this information 
by attaching examples of technical brochures which describe in de-
tail the investor's products. 
The second category of information concerns the French com-
pany in which the direct investment is to be made, and serves clearly 
to identify this entity, its legal form and its address, as well as its 
principal managers. 
In the third category, the investor is required to describe the 
nature of the contemplated investment. Where capital is to be sub-
scribed in kind rather than in cash or where a direct investment109 
is to be made by a financial transaction other than purchase of a 
capital interest, full disclosure of the transaction and the nature of 
the contribution is necessary. The total amount of the investment as 
well as the timetable for its full realization must be supplied. Most 
important, the distribution of the capital contribution between for-
eign and French shareholders must be set forth in full detail. 
The required information differs somewhat depending upon 
whether investment in an existing company or the creation of a new 
company is contemplated. In the former situation, the investor must 
supply the company's articles of incorporation and bylaws, a list of 
its shareholders (insofar as possible), an indication of its stated cap-
ital, and its financial statements for the previous three years, as well 
109. Direct investments, as described in the Notice (note 108 supra), may include: 
loans or guarantees of loans, purchase of debt instruments of all kinds, acquisition of 
rights in real property or of mining rights, technical or commercial assistance con-
tracts, and patent and trademark licenses. 
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as a statement and justification of the purchase price per share. The 
latter situation requires submission of the proposed articles of in-
corporation and bylaws, as well as a financial plan breaking down 
into various categories (incorporation expenses, real estate, plant, 
equipment, housing, and so forth) the capital to be invested and the 
proposed method of realization of this investment. In both cases, a 
proposed financial plan for the next four years must be supplied, 
indicating the relation of debt to equity and whether the financing 
is to be obtained in France or abroad. 
The fourth category is entitled "motives and effects of the 
planned investment,"110 and the information demanded here is ap-
parently intended to aid economic planners in predicting the long-
range effect of the investment on France's economy. Two issues stand 
out: the contribution to France's technical development and the 
effect of the investment on its balance of payments. 
The investor is required to analyze and describe its plans for 
production in France, including the nature of goods to be produced, 
the volume and value of production, the type of plant to be acquired 
or built, and the equipment to be utilized. In particular, the decla-
ration should state "if the project involves the creation of a center 
of technical research."111 If so, details as to its proposed operations 
should be set out. 
In order to show the effect on the balance of payments, the decla-
ration should describe the equipment to be imported, its price, and 
terms of payment. An estimate must be made of export production 
and export destinations and the declaration must indicate "if certain 
countries or certain zones will be contractually excluded from the 
market for the production of the French enterprise or company, or 
if certain countries or certain zones will, on the contrary, be reserved 
to it, or if no agreements of this nature are foreseen between the 
French company and its foreign shareholders or other companies of 
the same group."112 Finally, proposed commercial agreements be-
nv-een the foreign shareholder and the French company must be set 
forth. 
When the declaration of direct investment has been made accord-
ing to the strictures of the administration, the elements for decision 
are assembled. 
B. The Procedure of Decision 
The Ministry of Finance, which is granted the power to veto 
foreign loans and direct investment, is divided into four depart-
110. Notice, supra note 108, at 8. 
111. Id. at 9. 
112. Id. 
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ments: budget, taxes, economy, and treasury. The Department of 
the Treasury (Direction du Tresor) has been assigned the duty of 
processing declarations of direct investments and applications for 
approval of foreign loans.113 The Minister of Finance himself, how-
ever, has the ultimate responsibility for decision and, in important 
cases, may consider the proposed investment personally. He is aided 
by the Interministerial Committee on Foreign Investment (Le Co-
mite lnterministeriel des lnvestissements Etrangers) over which he 
presides.114 The thirteen other members of the Committee are a 
cross section of the government and represent the various interests 
which may be affected by foreign investments.115 The most important 
members of the Committee, in reference to particular investment 
applications, are the Minister of Industry and the Delegate for Re-
gional Planning, since the agencies which they represent are vitally 
concerned with the effect of new investments. The Interministerial 
Committee not only studies the general problems of French invest-
ment abroad and foreign investment in France, but also gives its 
opinion on particular projects which "present an exceptional impor-
tance because of their amount and characteristics."116 In practice it 
considers all investments amounting to more than 500,000 francs.117 
Even if the investment is not presented to the Interministerial 
Committee, it is the internal procedure of the Ministry of Finance 
to refer specific investment projects to those ministries representing 
interests which may be affected. Thus, all applications of any signifi-
cance are subjected to the scrutiny of departments other than the 
Ministry of Finance. A declaration of a proposed investment which 
will result either in the acquisition of control of an existing French 
company, or in the establishment of a new one, will ordinarily be 
113. Arrete of Jan. 27, 1967, arts. 3, 7, [1967] J.O. 1074. 
114. The committee as presently constituted was created under the prior exchange 
control regime in 1966 as a successor to a similar committee in existence since 1945. 
Arrete of May 4, 1966, [1966] J.O. 3605, as modified by Arrete of June 14, 1966, [1966] 
J.O. 5012. While the committee is not mentioned in the new law and regulations, it 
in fact continues to operate as in the past. 
115. The members are the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the 
Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Equipment, the Minister of Industry (who ex-
ercises functions comparable to those of the United States Secretary of Commerce), the 
Minister of Social Affairs (including labor and public health), the Minister in charge 
of Scientific Research, Atomic Energy and Space, the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Commerce, the Secretary General for National Defense, the Secretary General of the 
Inter-Departmental Committee for Questions Relating to European Economic Coopera-
tion, the Commissioner in charge of the Economic Plan, the Delegate for Regional 
Planning ("le dt!legut! a l'amt!nagement du territoire et a l'action rt!gionale''), and the 
Governor of the Bank of France. 
116. Arrete of May 4, 1966, art. 2, [1966] J.O. 3605. 
117. MINISTERE DE L'INDUSTRIE, RAPPORT SUR LES !NVESTISSEMENT ETRANGERS DANS 
L'lNDUSTRIES FRANgAISES (Bockanowski Report) 14 (1965); [1966] J.O. (Avis et Rapports 
du Conseil Economique et Social) 377, 386 (May 28, 1966). 
700 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 66:669 
referred by the Ministry of Finance (Treasury Department) to the 
technical staff of the Ministry of Industry. After analyzing the effect 
of the investment on French industry, this staff will then give its 
opinion, which will be relayed in turn to the Ministry of Finance. 
Similarly, where a new plant is to be built, the advice of the Regional 
Planning Department will be sought. The proposed location of the 
plant site will be considered in relation to the government's goal of 
decentralization and creation of new industry in regions of France 
which have traditionally been underdeveloped and which have not 
shared in France's current prosperity. 
As the declaration is processed by the various technical services, 
it is possible, especially in cases involving difficult issues, that the 
applicant will be called upon by the interested service to supply fur-
ther information, or to explain its position. Although the purpose of 
these meetings or communications with the ministries involved may 
frequently be simply to obtain informal clarification as to the details 
of the investment, in some cases the ministries may ask for amend-
ments of the planned investment so as to bring it more in line with 
government goals. Where conflict exists among various ministries,118 
modification of the application to meet the objections of an intran-
sigent department may bring about harmony and approval. Conces-
sions which might be requested could include, for example, renun-
ciation of rights to certain government subsidies ordinarily accorded 
to investments119 meeting criteria set forth in the government's eco-
nomic program (le Plan).120 
If the processing is not completed within the sixty-day limit pro-
vided by the decree,121 the Ministry will demand a postponement 
(ajournement) of the investment. Its letter will, however, stipulate 
that the postponement is only provisional and is intended to permit 
the various services to have time to process the declaration. Thus, 
administrative practice has, in fact, turned the sixty-day limit of the 
decree, which at first view seems to be a rigid statute of limitations, 
118. It is not infrequent that the interest of different ministries are in conflict. 
For example, Regional Planning might welcome a new investment which plans to lo-
cate in Brittany, which is industrially underdeveloped, but the Ministry of Industry 
might fear the impact of a highly developed industry in a field where the entry of 
new competitors may adversely affect budding French development. 
119. In principle, the laws granting special benefits do not discriminate against 
foreign-controlled corporations, and in the past such corporations have profited from 
subsidies and special loans. See J. GERVAIS, LA FRANCE FACE AUX !NVESTISSEMENTS 
ETRANGERS 46-47 (1963). 
120. The Plan is a comprehensive set of economic goals for France, which, not 
having the force of law, is to be attained by voluntary and quasi-voluntary measures 
in addition to economic incentives. The Fifth Plan covers the period 1966-1970. 
121. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 4(1), [1967] J.O. 1073. 
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into a statement of principle from which derogations may now be 
made at will. 
When the Ministry has arrived at a final decision, it will either 
request the permanent postponement of the investment or will no-
tify the applicant, in a document that has all the attributes of an 
authorization, that in the circumstances of the investment as set forth 
the Minister does not choose to exercise his right to demand post-
ponement. Interestingly enough the decree makes no provision for 
such a document. It only provides that the Minister may, within 
two months of the declaration, request the postponement of the in-
vestment, and that he may, in any event, renounce such right prior 
to the expiration of the two-month period.122 Since the Minister's 
authorization letter often will list the conditions upon which are 
predicated his agreement not to request postponement of the invest-
ment, simple administrative practice is again seen to extend the 
government powers beyond the scope apparently envisioned by the 
enabling law. It should be borne in mind that if the investment 
were subsequently to be effectuated in a manner not contemplated 
by the Minister's renunciation letter, it could be argued that the 
investment realized had not been properly declared to the authori-
ties and was thus in violation of foreign investment controls. The 
Minister's letter thus very closely resembles the authorization letters 
issued by the Ministry of Finance under the license procedures of 
wartime and postwar exchange controls, under which all unlicensed 
transfers or investments were forbidden. 
The use of the renunciation letter as a kind of license is indica-
tive of the attitude of the civil servants who are entrusted with the 
execution of foreign investment controls. Each proposed substantial 
foreign investment is treated as a case for full study as to its desir-
ability and effect on the French economy. The winds of change of 
the Law of December 28-"financial relations between France and 
other countries are free"-have not swept through the halls of rue 
de Rivoli and rue Clichy, where the administration continues its 
study and careful control of foreign investments. 
C. The Government's Policy and Its Background 
In order to understand the various actions which may be taken 
by the government on investment declarations submitted to it under 
the new regime, it is necessary to consider the recent history of the 
control of foreign investment. In a country known for its emphasis 
122. Id. 
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on theory and abstraction, it is remarkable that the French govern-
ment has never published criteria by which direct investment appli-
cations would be judged. Such a failure was perhaps understandable 
under the administration of the law in the postwar period: in March 
1963 the Ministry of Finance stated that no foreign investment ap-
plication had been refused in recent years,123 and this situation con-
tinued substantially unchanged through mid-1964.124 But from this 
period through 1965, an abrupt shift of emphasis occurred and in-
definite delays in processing applications became almost routine. 
While actual denials of investment applications were exceptional, 
considerable pressure was put on applicants either voluntarily to 
withdraw applications for investments deemed unsuitable, or to trans-
mute the proposed investment into a more suitable form. Even so, 
one author claims that from January to September 1965, 47 out of 
138 investment applications were denied outright by the Ministry 
of Finance.125 
During this difficult period for foreign investment, it became 
known that the Ministry was formulating guidelines which would 
be the "bible" for foreigners seeking to invest in France. These 
guidelines, however, never appeared. Among the probably numer-
ous reasons for this failure, the two principal ones seem to have been 
changing governmental attitudes toward the dangers of foreign in-
vestment, and internal disputes among the concerned agencies as to 
criteria for desirable investments.126 
The first reaction to the ever-increasing volume of foreign invest-
ments was thus simply to hinder and delay all substantial (and some 
not so substantial) investments, in the hopes that investors would 
become discouraged. Instructions went out from the Minister of 
Finance to his services to examine each investment application with 
great care and to make a choice between "good" and "bad" invest-
ments.127 This resulted, in 1965, in a very substantial drop in foreign, 
123. See GERVAIS, supra note 119, at 39. 
124. For a history of this early period see Dusart, The Impact of the French Gov-
ernment on American Investment in France, 7 HARV. INT'L L. Cum J. 75 (1965). 
125. L. l\1ANUALI, LA FRANCE A L'IMPLANTATION ETRANGERE 42 (1967). See also Le 
Monde, Sept. 16, 1965, at 19, col. I. Just as the Ministry's statement that as of March 
1963 no investment application had been rejected is a bit suspect due to unofficial 
methods of frustrating investment applications, it may also be wondered whether a 
number of these forty-seven refusals were not later tempered by authorization of sub-
sequently modified applications. 
126. In fact, during this period the only two previously enunciated general theo-
ries of investment control-favoring investment in new companies over takeovers and 
determining favorable and unfavorable sectors of the economy for foreign investment 
-were abandoned as unworkable. (1966] J.O. (Avis et Rapports du Conseil Econo-
mique et Social') 377, 395 (May 28, 1966). 
127. Le Figaro, Feb. 3, 1966, at 17, col. 2. 
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and particularly American, investments,128 which was followed by an 
even steeper drop in 1966, when the full effect of corporate invest-
ment decisions made in 1964 and 1965 was felt.129 But it soon be-
came apparent that since the foreign investors were perfectly free to 
establish in a Common Market neighbor and export their products 
into France, the policy of careful sifting combined with a policy of 
undiscriminating delay was an ineffective long-range solution to the 
problem. In fact, during this period American investment in Ger-
many and particularly in Belgium showed a marked increase.130 
The search for a new policy may be said to date from the replace-
ment, in January 1966, of Valery Giscard d'Estaing by Michel Debre 
as Minister of Finance. Debre was responsible for the creation of the 
Interministerial Investment Committee which was to aid in fornm-
lating a policy as to the categories of investments to be limited. It 
was indicated that the task of the committee was to create "jurispru-
dence," or case law, rather than "doctrine," or textbook policy.131 
According to the Ministry of Finance, the policy was to embody a 
presumption that foreign investments would be allowed unless they 
adversely affected a sensitive national interest.132 The Minister of 
Finance has repeated, on several occasions, his reference to the pre-
sumption in favor of foreign-including American-investment.133 
And, ever since the extraordinary public announcement by the Min-
istry on March 24, 1966, that Motorola, a United States corporation, 
had been authorized to set up a plant in Toulouse for the manufac-
ture of semi-conductors-no announcement of investment authoriza-
tion is ordinarily given-the approach has been to study foreign in-
vestment applications on a case-by-case basis in the light of this fa-
vorable presumption. 
Action on investment applications is taken within the context of 
French economic and political goals. Foreign investment in general 
presents several possible economic advantages: especially in view of 
the slump in domestic investment, 134 foreign investment in plant and 
128. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 34 (Sept. 1966). 
129. See MINISTERE DE L'ECONOMIE ET DES FINANCES, BALANCE DES PAIEMENTS DE 
L'ANNEE 1966 auiy 1967): U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 128, at 42 (Sept. 
1967). See also report of the Minister of Finance to the Comitt! Interministeriel des 
Investissements Etrangers, Le Monde, Sept. 21, 1967, at 21, col. 1. 
130. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 128, at 12 (Sept. 1967). 
131. Mooney, Investments in France, New York Times (International ed.), March 24, 
1966, at 1, col. 3. 
132. Le Monde, Feb. 18, 1966, at 1, col. 5 (statement attributed to Debre). 
133. Speech of Minister Debre to the French Chamber of Commerce in the United 
States, Paris-Presse-L'Intransigeant-France-Soir, June 24, 1967, at 5, col. 3; Address 
Before National Assembly, International Herald Tribune, June 30, 1967, at 1, col. 3. 
134. MINISTERE DE L'INDUSTRIE, supra note 117, at 2 (increase in investments of 12% 
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equipment aids in stimulating industrial expansion, compet1t1on, 
and increased employment; foreign investment also improves the 
commercial balance of payments position, by replacing imports with 
national production, and furthers French technology through contri-
butions of sophisticated foreign equipment and know-how. Further-
more, the continued surplus of private foreign investment in France 
over such French investment abroad has in recent years more than 
covered a persistent balance of payments deficit in the public sector, 
thus engendering a favorable over-all balance of payments.135 
However, certain investments present various economic disad-
vantages which may outweigh such benefits. Among these is the 
possible domination of a sector of the economy by a giant industrial 
concern, leading to monopolization and solidification of the price 
structure rather than to an increase in price competition. More 
likely is the risk that a foreign-controlled company will fail to respect 
norms of the Economic Plan. Inflationary pressures may result both 
from new investments and subsequent financing which, if from for-
eign sources, may circumvent rigid French credit controls. Also, in 
some circumstances, foreign investment may even affect adversely the 
French balance of payments: companies falling under foreign con-
trol may increase importations from the foreign parent; payments of 
royalties and fees for use of foreign industrial property and technical 
assistance may increase; and the long-term balance of payments may 
eventually be affected as successful investments begin to pay divi-
dends abroad. 
On the political level, the balance is likely to be equally as diffi-
cult to draw. There is, of course, a natural resistance against allow-
ing any sector of the economy important to national security and 
welfare, in their broadest terms, to be dominated by foreign interests. 
Moreover, as reliance on foreign technology, research, and develop-
ment is thought to lead to foreign economic domination, the govern-
ment scrutinizes most carefully applications for investments in in-
dustries where new technology and research is of high importance; 
indeed, authorization may be conditioned upon the research and de-
velopment taking place in France. Also, there is a fear that practices 
of foreign-controlled companies in dealing with labor may violate 
French traditions, particularly in decisions to shut down temporarily 
or permanently an unprofitable plant. And, whether because of pos-
in 1960 fell to an increase of 2.4% in 1964, much less than the increase of national 
production). 
135. MINISTERE DE L'EcoNOMIE ET DES FINANCES, supra note 129; see also E. SCHMILL, 
LEs !NVESTISSEMENTS ETRANGERS EN FRANCE 28 (1966). 
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sible limitation of export trade by a foreign govemment186 or because 
of a desire that important decisions regarding French companies be 
made in France by Frenchmen pursuant to French practices,137 there 
undoubtedly exists generally a diffuse fear of foreign-controlled com-
panies,138 most recently crystallized in criticisms of the mainmise, or 
takeover, of French industry by Americans.139 Despite these political 
fears, however, there are still those in France who see some benefit 
in the importation of new business ideas and policies from the New 
World.140 It has even been stated that if American investment in 
France had no other justification, the contribution it has made to 
consistency in accounting and full disclosure to fiscal authorities and 
shareholders is a welcome innovation to the French economy and 
one which no doubt have a widespread beneficial effect. 
The new investment controls certainly give the French govern-
ment the tools for dealing with the problems posed by foreign in-
vestment. While the tools are new, however, the problems are not, 
and it is probable that, in the absence of any new decisional guide-
lines in either the new law or regulations, the policies above de-
scribed, which may be gleaned from case-by-case studies over the 
years, will continue to be applied. 
In the vast majority of cases under the new law, authorization to 
make the proposed investment will, after careful study, be granted, 
either in its original form or as modified to meet administration 
objections. The conclusion by the administration that a particular 
136. Notably the United States government in applying the prohibitions of the 
Trading with the Enemy Act to prevent trade by French subsidiaries with Communist 
China. This limitation led to private litigation in one case in which minority share-
holders of an American controlled corporation successfully prevented the majority 
shareholders from causing the French subsidiary to break its contract for delivery of 
manufactured products to Communist China. Ste Fruehauf v. Massardy, [1965] Sem. 
Jur. II. 14274 bis (Cour d'appel, Paris). This decision was followed by an exchange of 
diplomatic notes instituted by the government of France, which remain unpublished. 
The French government was presumably critical of the United States government's 
extraterritorial application of its regulatory legislation to French corporations. Ac-
cording to one author the example of the Fruehauf case was one of the principal 
reasons for the increased vigor of investment screening in 1965 and 1966. Y. Loussouarn, 
Le Regime ]uridique des Investissements Etrangers en France, in ETUDES DE DROIT 
CoNTEMPORAIN (Report of the Seventh International Congress of Comparative Law, 
Uppsala, 1966). 
137. See address of Minister Debre to Paris meeting of French Chamber of Com-
merce in the United States. International Herald Tribune, June 23, 1967, at 1, col. 7. 
138. For a good review of the political problems of American direct investment 
abroad, see Model, The Politics of Private Foreign Investment, 45 FOREIGN AFFAIRS Q. 
639-51 (1967). 
139. Press Conference of General de Gaulle. Le Monde, Nov. 29, 1967, at 2, col. 4. 
(The criticism was based on an argument that direct investment from American 
sources in view of the continued deficit in the United States balance of payments was 
made with "inflated" dollars.) 
140. See, e.g., J. SERVAN-SCHREIBER, LE DEFI AMERl:CAIN (1967). 
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investment presents net economic and political disadvantages will 
result in disapproval only in aggravated cases. But the fact remains 
that every proposed investment will be evaluated under the struc-
ture and procedures of the new law, and, in particular cases, certain 
applications may be denied. The question must be asked whether 
such procedures and actions are consistent with France's treaty obli-
gations. 
VI. CONTROL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND FRANCE'S 
TREATY OBLIGATIONS 
The freedom of France to restrict and control foreign investment 
may be limited either by its bilateral treaties of establishment with 
other nations, of which the Franco-American Convention of Estab-
lishment is an example,141 or by the Treaty of Rome, the multilateral 
treaty establishing the Common Market. The supremacy of treaty 
provisions over any inconsistent provision of domestic law is not only 
recognized by the French Constitution, but also is specifically re-
peated in Law No. 66-1008 itself.142 We will first examine whether 
the new foreign investment controls are compatible with each of 
these treaties and then discuss whether the treaty provisions can 
serve as a means to eliminate the screening of foreign investments 
and to review refusals of permission to invest. 
A. The Franco-American Convention of Establishment 
Article 5 of this treaty provides for national treatment for 
American investors in the following language: 
I. Nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party 
shall be accorded national treatment with respect to engaging in all 
types of commercial, industrial, financial and other activities for 
gain within the territories of the other High Contracting Party .••. 
Accordingly, such nationals and companies shall be permitted within 
such territories: 
(b) to organize companies under the general company laws of 
such other High Contracting Party, and to acquire majority interests 
in companies of such other High Contracting Party; 
(c) to control and manage the enterprises which they have estab-
lished or acquired. 
Moreover, the enterprises which they control ... shall in all that 
relates to the conduct of the activities thereof, be accorded treatment 
141. [1960) 2 U.S.T. 2398; [1960) J.O. 11220. 
142. Law No. 66-1008 of Dec. 28, 1966, art. 1, [1966) J.O. 11622. 
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no less favorable than that accorded like enterprises controlled by 
nationals and companies of such other High Contracting Party. 
The treaty provisions are quite clearly drafted to protect capital 
exportation-to protect, that is, the rights of establishment and in-
vestment.143 The broad scope of this protection would seem, on its 
face, to be inconsistent with the two key provisions of the new law 
on foreign investment-the right of the government to veto new 
American direct investments and the new provisions which subject 
French corporations, owned by Americans, to declaration procedures 
(and possible veto of expansion or direct investment plans) to which 
other French corporations are not subjected. 
Other articles of the treaty, however, establish exceptions to the 
general principle of national treatment. The treaty was signed in 
1959 in the knowledge that France had a full-fledged system of ex-
change controls. Such exchange controls were, moreover, consistent 
with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 
of which both parties were signatories.144 Thus, article X of the 
Franco-American Treaty recognizes the problem of exchange con-
trols; it provides in paragraph (I) for national treatment as to cur-
rency transfers, and, in the succeeding paragraph, limits each party's 
right to impose exchange controls "to the extent necessary to pre-
vent its monetary reserves from falling to a very low level or to ef-
fect a moderate increase in very low monetary reserves."145 Accord-
ing to article X(3), the two parties, "recognizing that the freedom of 
movement of investment capital and of the returns thereon would 
be conducive to the reallegation of the objectives of the present 
Convention, are agreed that such movements shall not be unneces-
sarily hampered." Each party was to "make every effort to accord, 
in the greatest possible measure, to nationals and companies of the 
other High Contracting Party the opportunity to make investments 
.... " (Emphasis added.) And, in addition, each nation was permit-
ted by article 14 of the treaty's protocol to "subject to authoriza-
tion" the making of investments by foreign nationals and com-
panies "with a view to protecting its currency or facilitating the 
143. Thus, there is no specific language to protect the rights of a party to receive 
investment from the other contracting party. Accordingly, exchange controls to pre-
vent the flight of capital, as in the case of the newly imposed United States regula-
tions on capital transfers abroad (see text accompanying note 176 infra) are not spe-
cifically forbidden. 
144. 60 Stat. 1440 (1945). 
145. For the view that the decision of a government to impose exchange controls 
based on low reserves may be attacked as a violation of treaty provisions only if "the 
judgment is obviously unreasonable or in bad faith," see Metzger, Exchange Controls 
in International Law, 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 311. 
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servicing of the proceeds of investments and the repatriation of 
capital." 
- While this is hardly a ringing declaration of an absolute right to 
invest in all circumstances, it is nevertheless questionable whether 
the treaty's derogations from national treatment for investment, 
added to permit the continuance of exchange controls then needed 
to prevent France's monetary reserves "from falling to a very low 
level," may be used as a justification for control of foreign invest• 
ment today, in the light of strong monetary reserves and the aboli• 
tion of exchange controls. Even more pointed is the absence of any 
monetary justification for regulating the activities of American-
controlled French companies, which are to receive national treat-
ment under the treaty, but which are singled out for special treat-
ment by the foreign investment controls. 
Another escape clause from the national treatment principle of 
the treaty may be found in the provision of article XII( d) that "the 
provisions of the present Convention shall not preclude the applica-
tion of measures . . . necessary . . . to protect its essential security 
interests." But this must be read in the context of the rest of article 
XII, the subject matter of which is national freedom to regulate 
questions of traffic in arms and radioactive materials, and to restore 
peace and security. It is thus highly doubtful that article XII(d) was 
intended to serve as the basis for an entire system of economic regu-
lation. 
The probable French answer to these somewhat legalistic argu-
ments would be one of confession and avoidance. The real point, 
they would maintain (as indeed the French Conseil Economique et 
Social has),148 is that the treaty merely "lays down the principle" of 
equality of investment opportunity. The very general terms of the 
treaty were not, it would be claimed, intended to be rigorously ap-
plied to specific cases; like so many treaty provisions, they were to 
have the character of exhortation alone, to be resorted to by a re-
jected investor only in the event of clear bad faith. 
An advocate of the French position could even draw an analogy 
between the national treatment and nondiscrimination provisions of 
the convention and the equal protection clause of the federal Con-
stitution. The fourteenth amendment, of course, does not proscribe 
mere differentials in treatment among persons; it is only when such 
differentials are seen as irrational or irrelevant in terms of legitimate 
146. [1966] J.O. (Avis et Rapports du Conseil Economique et Social) 11 (May 28, 
1966). 
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national goals that they are struck down.147 Thus it may be argued 
that the treaty lays down the principle of equality of investment 
opportunity in the same sense that the fourteenth amendment estab-
lishes the principle of equal protection, a principle subject to adap-
tation in the light of the needs and the lawful purposes of the nation. 
The application of this principle must be measured both against 
the procedures set up for foreign investment authorizations and the 
implicitly reserved power of the government to veto undesirable 
investments. 
The French government has consistently taken the position that 
it has the power, before permitting foreigners to exercise their treaty 
rights, to subject them to application and licensing procedures. Thus 
foreign nationals (including Americans)148 enjoying the treaty right 
to engage in business in France may nonetheless be required to 
obtain a carte de commerfant before engaging in business. Such a 
requirement, the government has stated, does not affect the "en-
joyment" of the rights granted by the convention, but only "the 
condition of the exercise of these rights."149 
The contention that the enjoyment of substantive treaty rights 
may be conditioned upon the fulfillment of elaborate procedural 
prerequisites is difficult to defend. Even in the carte de commerfant 
cases-where one may concede as consistent with the treaty the res-
ervation by the state of some police powers to verify the entry and 
activities of aliens150-French courts have found the government's 
distinction tenuous, and decisions by courts which have considered 
the issue on the merits may be found both sanctioning and disap-
proving the government's procedures.151 The application of declara-
147. Tussman & tenBrock, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 
(1949). 
148. Ministerial response to a written question in parliament, stating that Ameri-
can citizens are required to obtain a carte de commerfant prior to engaging in busi-
ness in France despite the terms of the Treaty of Establishment. Rep. Min. No. 9258, 
[1961] J.O. (Dt!bats Parlemen. de l'Assemblt!e Nationale) 401. 
149. Letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 15, 1957, [1957] J.O. 5235 (in-
terpreting Franco-Spanish Treaty to permit France to require carte de commerfant 
for Spanish citizens engaging in business in France). 
150. Compare the requirements of § 221 of the United States Immigration and 
Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1201 (1964). For an example of limitations of the police 
powers under the Rome Treaty, see note 159 infra. 
151. Compare Coll, [1952] Gaz. du Pal. I 366 (Cour d'Appel de Paris); Sanchez, 
[1952] Gaz. du Pal. I 142 (Cour d'Appel de Lyon), rev'd, [1953] D. Jur. 365 (Cass. crim.); 
Cot-Riera, [1953] Sem. Jur. II 7379 (Cour d'Appel de Riom); Bruni and Galtier, [1953] 
D. Jur. 425 (Cass. crim.). More recently, however, the criminal chamber of France's 
highest court has found that it was bound by a theory of separation of powers to 
accept the executive department's interpretation of applicable treaty limitations and 
accordingly has determined that the exercise of commerce by persons not having ob• 
tained a carte de commerfant constitutes a criminal offense despite the fact that the 
defendants were entitled to national treatment. See cases cited in note 169 infra. 
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tion and control procedures to Americans of investing in France 
raises more serious treaty questions, as the police power rationale 
implicit in the carte de commerfant cases has greatly diminished 
application when the issue is the entry of capital rather the entry 
and establishment of persons. The extension of these declaration 
procedures to the economic activities of French companies controlled 
by foreign shareholders seems even more clearly to conflict with 
treaty principles, for such companies have French nationality under 
French internal law152 and article V of the treaty clearly provides 
that French companies controlled by Americans shall be accorded 
treatment "no less favorable than that accorded like enterprises" 
controlled by French citizens. Thus, in both situations above dis-
cussed it is arguable that the imposition of the declaration require-
ments, even if those procedures were intended only to verify the 
origin and nature of the investment, is contrary to the treaty. 
Even if the validity of the procedural requirements, standing 
alone, is assumed, the treaty issue is most clearly posed by the power 
that the new legislation seems to give to the Minister of Finance to 
veto foreign investments at will and upon grounds limited only by 
his own discretion. May an investment by American citizens, or by 
French companies controlled by Americans, be "postponed" forever 
simply because the government finds it undesirable? Such a result is 
difficult to admit if establishment treaties are considered to create 
effectively binding obligations, a concept which France has not de-
nied in the past. In an important case decided by the Conseil 
d'Etat,153 it was held that while the French government could re-
quire a Swiss citizen, entitled to national treatment under the 
Franco-Swiss Treaty of Establishment, to obtain a carte de commer-
fant before being authorized to sell liquor in France, it could not 
refuse to grant such a card, even though French internal law forbade 
foreigners to engage in such activities. The legislation, it was held, 
could not have been intended to infringe upon a vested treaty right 
to national treatment.1154 The treaty rights here in question do not 
seem any less worthy of protection. 
The official French position on the relationship between the in-
vestment controls established by French law and the Franco-Ameri-
152. Law No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, art. 3, (1966] J.O. 6402. See also text accom-
panying notes 102-07 infra. 
153. Hurni, [1965] Sem. Jur. II. 14172 bis (Conseil d'Etat). 
154. This is the traditional French judicial interpretation, which avoids conflict 
between a treaty and a law, and gives, when possible, predominant effect to the treaty. 
See H. BATTIFFOL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 41 (4th ed. 1967). 
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can and similar treaties of establishment is not yet known. Such an 
official interpretation could only be given by the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs upon the request of a tribunal before which the issue had 
actually been presented. However, the drafting of the foreign invest-
ment law and regulations displays a desire to avoid a head-on conflict; 
not only does the law expressly state that it is subject to the obliga-
tions of international treaties, it also avoids granting a direct veto 
power to the government, by the proviso that it may only "postpone" 
an undesirable foreign investment. In this way outright conflict be-
tween the terms of the treaty and the provisions of the law and 
regulations is avoided. The French government thus preserves an 
almost complete freedom of action for its future official interpreta-
tion of the treaty on a case-by-case basis. However, because of the 
nature of the investment rights to be protected and the procedural 
difficulties in enforcing bilateral treaty provisions, it may be doubted 
that the executive branch of the French goverment will be called 
upon to give its official views as to the compatibility of certain pro-
visions of the foreign investment controls with the treaty. To the 
extent that treaty provisions of any kind may be brought to bear on 
the French regulations, it is probable that, whenever possible, the 
Treaty of Rome, with its more explicit obligations and multina-
tional procedures, will be relied upon in lieu of bilateral treaties. 
B. The Treaty of Rome 
The potential American investor in France may well look for 
protection to the Treaty of Rome, the progenitor of the European 
Economic Community. Various articles of this treaty look toward 
the gradual formation of a unified European capital market: article 
7 lays down the broad principle that, subject to more specific provi-
sions, "any discrimination on the grounds of nationality shall be 
prohibited";11515 under article 52, restrictions on freedom of estab-
lishment-notably on the right of nationals of member states "to 
set up and manage undertakings"-"shall be abolished by progres-
sive stages." Article 67, dealing specifically with restrictions on ex-
change and investment, provides: 
During the transitional period, Member States shall, in so far as may 
be necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the Common Mar-
155. Despite qualifying language ("within the field of application of this Treaty") 
art. 7 might be read to reach all foreign nationals, not merely nationals of Common 
Market states; in light of what follows, however, it is most unlikely that this was the 
intended meaning. See also art. 68(2). 
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ket, progressively abolish between themselves restrictions on the 
movement of capital belonging to persons resident in Member States 
and any discrimination based on the nationality or the place of resi-
dence of the parties or on the place where such capital is invested. 
The directives of the Council of Ministers implementing article 67 
have clarified and strengthened its rather vague import: as of 1960, 
for example, member states were to "grant all exchange authoriza-
tions required for the completion or execution" of direct invest-
ments156 and to "grant general authorizations" for the acquisition 
of securities traded on the stock exchange; as to securities not so 
traded, existing "exchange restrictions on capital movements" might 
be maintained "if the freedom of these capital movements is of such 
a nature as to create an obstacle to the realization of the objectives 
of the economic policy of a Member State .... "157 Existing exchange 
restrictions on "the issuance and sale of securities of a domestic en-
terprise on a foreign capital market" are also permitted, subject to 
the same condition; however, a proposed directive submitted by the 
Common Market Commission to the Council on February 7, 1967, 
would require exchange authorizations to be granted for such trans-
actions.158 And finally, article 221 of the treaty serves as the keystone 
of the policy of nondiscrimination: within three years after the 
treaty's effective date, "without prejudice to the other provisions" 
of the treaty, member si:ates were to allow the nationals of other 
member states "to participate financially in the capital of firms or 
companies ... in the same manner as their own nationals."159 
Deputies in the European Parliament have already questioned 
whether the new French regulations are not incompatible with these 
articles of the Rome Treaty160 and a formal response by the Com-
mission is awaited. Nor is the French government itself unaware of 
the potential combined effect of these provisions; the Conseil Eco-
156. "Excepting purely financial investments made only in order to afford the in-
vestor indirect access to the monetary or financial market of another country, through 
the establishment of or participation in an enterprise situated in such country. Annex 
I, list A to First and Second Directives for the Implementation of Treaty Article 67. 
1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ,rn 1651-67 (May 11, 1960). 
157. First and Second Directives for the Implementation of Treaty art. 67, 1 CCH 
CoMM. MKT. REP. ,r,r 1651-67 (May 11, 1960). 
158. Id. ,I 1676. 
159. The potential loophole of art. 56, authorizing "special treatment for foreign 
nationals on the grounds of public policy, public security and public health," has 
been narrowed by a Counsel directive, restricting the invocation of the article to 
measures based on the personal conduct of the individual concerned rather than for 
economic ends. 1 CCH CoID.I. MKT. REP. ,r 1412.15 (Feb. 25, 1964). 
· 160. See [1967] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DES COID.IUNAUTES EUROPEENES 1652 (question 
ecrite No. 1/67, March 15, 1967). See also id. at 1022 (question ecrite No. 152, Feb. 22, 
1967). 
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nomique et Social has gone so far as to say that the treaty "renders 
impossible . . . any limitation of investments made by nationals 
[ressortissants] of other member states ... even if they are effec-
tively under the control of a national of a third country."161 In order 
to determine whether the treaty may plausibly be invoked by Amer-
icans seeking to invest in France, it must be asked whether this as-
sessment by the Conseil Economique et Social is to be taken at face 
value: may, for example, Belgian corporations owned and controlled 
by Americans profit from the provisions of the treaty to the same 
extent as wholly Belgian companies? And even if so, is the French 
requirement of authorization prior to investment in fact incompat-
ible with the treaty? 
The treaty itself indicates that in certain cases capital originat-
ing outside the Community-which could include American capital 
-is to be assimilated into Community investment: under article 58, 
companies "formed in accordance with the law of a Member State 
and having their registered office, central administration or principal 
place of business within the Community" are to be treated as "na-
tionals" of that member state. In order for a corporation to benefit 
from the directives on freedom of establishment, the Council has 
further required that it "show an effective and continuous link with 
the economy of a Member State" but has specifically excluded de-
pendence on the nationality of managers or stockholders as a cri-
terion upon which this determination could be based;162 since ar-
ticle 67 protects "residents" as well as "nationals," substantial busi-
ness "links," even ·without incorporation in a member state, would 
presumably suffice to invoke that article.163 Therefore, a Belgian 
corporation, by whomever controlled, doing business in Belgium 
and not formed merely for the purpose of investing in France, should 
be able to claim the protection of the treaty. That a corporation 
organized under Belgian law would be attributed Belgian "nation-
ality" for purposes of diplomatic protection is, in addition, a well-
accepted proposition of international law.164 
161. (1966] J.O. (Avis et Rapports du Conseil Economique et Social) 377, 383 
(May 28, 1966) (emphasis added). 
162. General Program for the Abolition of Restrictions on Freedom of Establish-
ment, 1 CCH Co~n.r. MKT. REP. ,r,r 1335, 1336 (1961). See also U. EVERLING, THE 
RIGHT OF EsTABUSHMENT IN THE CommN MARKET 74-77 (1964). 
163. Cf. 1 CCH C<>MM. MKT. REP. 1f 1602.13; EVERLING, supra note 162, at 76-77. 
164. See In re Mexico Plantagen G.m.b.H., [1931-1932] Ann. Dig. (No. 135) (Ger-
man-Mexican Claims Comm. 1930); C. HYDE, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAw 902-03 (2d rev. ed. 
1945); RE5TATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 
§§ 27, 172-73 (1965). 
Note that this American recourse to foreign incorporation might also be possible 
under establishment treaties similar to that between France and the Togolese Repub-
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Whether corporations under the protection of the treaty may 
nevertheless be obliged to obtain at least the authorization of a state 
before engaging in investment activities is a more difficult question. 
The rules of the Community in analogous areas present no clear 
picture. In implementing article 48 of the treaty providing for the 
"free movement of labor" without "discrimination based on nation-
ality," the Council has not gone so far as to abolish the requirement 
of work and residence permits for foreign laborers-although it is 
clear that nationals of member states have the right to be issued such 
permits.165 On the other hand, the Council's "general program" for 
the abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment specifically 
requires the ending of restrictions which "condition access" to busi-
ness "on an authorization or on the issuance of a document, such as 
a foreign merchant's card."166 As to capital movements, the Council's 
directive implementing article 67 does, it is true, require "general" 
and presumably blanket "authorizations" for certain types of invest-
ment transactions.161 But this is restricted essentially to the acquisi-
tion of listed securities, and in any event the directive preserves the 
right of states "to verify the nature and authenticity of the transac-
tions . . . [ and] to take the measures essential for the prevention of 
infringements of their laws and regulations."168 
Even under the Rome Treaty, then, at its present stage of imple-
mentation, it is possible that an authorization mechanism for direct 
investments is permissible, when that mechanism does no more than 
permit a state to assure itself that the proposed investment in fact 
qualifies under the treaty and does not endanger essential security 
interests. However, due to the universally held view that Commu-
lic, under which corporations "constituted in conformity with the laws of one of the 
parties and having their siege social on its territory" were given the same rights as 
individual nationals of the country. Convention of Establishment between France 
and the Togolese Republic, art. 13, June 5, 1964. Decree No. 67-82, [1967} J.O. 1081 
specifically exempts from the declaration procedures investments from countries 
"dont l'institut d'emission est lie au Tresor franfais par une convention d'operation" 
-these countries, which include Togo, were part of France's colonial empire. Contrary 
to the treaty provision, the decree excludes investments by companies of these coun-
tries if they are under foreign control (art. V). Cf. art. 13 of the Franco-American 
Treaty, under which France could deny the advantages of the treaty "to any com• 
pany in the ownership or direction of which nationals of a third country • • • have 
directly or indirectly a controlling interest •••• " 
165. Regulation No. 38/64, art. 22, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ,J 1053 (March 25, 
1964); "Residence Permit," Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court) Berlin, Case No. 
VG.I A 98/62, Oct. 26, 1962; Council Directive, March 25, 1964, arts. 3-5, 1 CCH 
COMM. MKT. REP. ,J1[ 1098-100 (March 25, 1964). 
166. General Program, supra note 162, at 1115. However, the "right of permanent 
residence" was still to be "evidenced by a residence permit,'' to be granted except for 
"reasons of public order, safety or health." Council Directive of Feb. 25, 1964, 1 CCH 
CoMM. MKT. REP. ,r 1349.17. See also note 149 supra. 
167. Article 2, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1f 1653. 
168. Article 5(1), 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1f 1656. 
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nity members have a treaty right to invest in France, the use of such 
procedures either to delay or to deny particular qualified investments 
might well bring into play Community action. 
C. Enforcement of Treaty Obligations 
While objective analysis of both the bi-national and multinational 
treaty provisions casts some doubt on the validity of the entire sys-
tem of foreign investment controls and leads to the conclusion that 
in most circumstances denial of authorization of foreign investment 
would constitute a violation of treaty obligations, there may be no 
manner of practical recourse for the rejected investor, since it is 
possible that no mechanism exists by which the legal rights created 
by the treaty could be effectively enforced. A strictly legal analysis 
of the remedies available quickly reveals the difficulty of securing 
judicial vindication of a treaty right in private litigation. The Cham-
bre Criminelle of the French Gour de Cassation, to which criminal 
prosecutions for violation of the investment regulations would be 
referred, continues to adhere to the principle that only the execu-
tive branch of the government is competent to interpret treaties of 
establishment.169 Hence, the court would postpone ruling on a ques-
tion involving the interpretation of treaties and would solicit the 
binding advice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The views of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, delivered after consultation with the 
Ministry of Finance, would, it may be thought, reject any proposed 
treaty interpretation which would have the result of nullifying the 
government's investment control program. An investor who failed 
to comply with procedures called for by the foreign investment regu-
lations would then be subject to criminal penalties applied by a 
court, despite the fact that he could not obtain a judicial determi-
nation as to treaty defenses he might raise. Review of administrative 
decisions by administrative tribunals would encounter a similar def-
erence to government interpretations170 and would face the further 
difficulty that only in situations of outright denial or, perhaps, in 
169. Femme Aschbacher and Lertola, [1963] D. Jur. 531 (Cass. aim.); Coll, [1959] 
Bull. Crim. 7, n.5; [1961] Rev. Crit. D.I.P. 136 (Cass. aim.); Proc. Gen. Colmar v. 
Mongeluzzo, [1958] Bull. Crim. No. 632, at 1118, [1961] Rev. Crit. D.I.P. 136 (Cass. 
crim.). The criminal chamber's renunciation of judicial interpretation of provisions of 
international treaties, and its acceptance of the government's views, is not shared by 
the First Section of the Civil Chamber which maintains its right to interpret treaties 
except on questions of "public international law.'' Receveur-percepteur de Paris v. 
Chassagne [1963] D. Jur. 529 (Cass. Civ. ler Sect.). However, as questions of failure to 
obtain cartes de commerrant or to obey foreign investment controls call forth criminal 
penalties, the views of the criminal chamber seem pertinent. 
170. See, e.g., Hurni, [1965] Sem. Jur. II. 14172 bis (Conseil d'Etat); Soc. Commentry, 
Fourchambault &: Decazeville, [1952] D. Jur. 454 (Conseil d'Etat); Union Regionale 
Algerienne de la C.F.T.C. [1963] J. DROIT !Nr'L 402 (Conseil d'Etat). 
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aggravated cases of delay would reviewable action have occurred.171 
Litigation brought by an individual to enforce rights under the 
Treaty of Rome might well be determined entirely under French 
procedures. The European Court of Justice is only competent to 
hear suits brought by the Commission or by a member state; while 
under article 177 of the Rome Treaty national courts of last resort 
are "bound," in private litigations, to refer interpretations of the 
treaty to the court, there is no possibilty of an appeal to the court 
if this reference is not made. In a recent notable case before the Con-
seil d'Etat dealing with difficult questions under the Rome Treaty, 
the Conseil retained for itself the power of final decision by holding 
that the treaty provis_ion was clear on its face and was thus a question 
of "application" rather than "interpretation."172 Of course, where a 
French court finds that a treaty provision is clear on its face so as to 
avoid reference to the Luxembourg court, the case would seem to 
call for direct judicial "application" of the terms of the treaty with-
out taking cognizance of the executive's interpretation. This seems, 
however, to offer but a scant hope of breaking the closed interpre-
tive loop, and the prospects of success in private litigation are not 
bright. 
Evaluation of the prospects of success in litigation is, moreover, 
largely a theoretical exercise, for a disappointed investor is not often 
a potential litigator. Under the old exchange control laws, no suit 
was ever brought to review the denial of a foreign investment appli-
cation. A survey taken of American businesses in France during the 
restrictive investment period of 1965 shows that among companies 
which considered themselves subject to discrimination or treatment 
contrary to the spirit of the Establishment Treaty, no thought was 
given to seeking diplomatic intervention, let alone a battle in 
the French courts.173 The investor simply has no desire to antagonize 
the government of the country in which he wishes to operate. 
This apparent lack of desire to seek judicial determination of 
foreign investment questions demonstrates that it may well be mis-
leading to approach the problem in terms of a traditional legal anal-
ysis of rights and remedies. To some extent, all treaties-treaties of 
alliance are the most extreme example-represent merely an indica-
171. See M. WALINE, DROIT AnMINISTRATIF 207-14 (9th ed. 1963). The "adjourn-
ment" mechanism of Law No. 66-1008, [1966] J.O. 11621, might be interpreted as consti-
tuting a statutory exception to the "implicit rejection" which French law presumes after 
a four-month silence on the part of the administration. 
172. Societe des Petroles Shell-Berre, (Conseil d'Etat), 1 CCH Cor.m. MKT. REP. 1l 
4656.55 (1964), [1964] J. DROIT lNT'L 794. 
173. See REPORT OF THE COMM. ON COMMERCIAL TREATIES, ABA SECTION OF INT'L & 
COMP. LAW 18 (1965). 
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tion of present willingness, a sign of a present climate. Conceptions 
of national purpose and of the proper direction of the national econ-
omy may change, and, as to matters which it conceives to be closely 
tied to its essential interests, it is ultimately impossible to force a na-
tion to acquiesce in past perspectives. Furthermore, it can only be 
shortsighted to attempt to impose capital investment on any nation 
against its will; whatever "success" is gained by diplomatic or judi-
cial agitation can only be short-lived, given a state's ability to take, 
perhaps without possibility of recourse, punitive measures against 
enterprises once they have built up a substantial investment. En-
couragement of international trade and investment, however desir-
able, is not accomplished through insistence on supposed treaty rights 
which another nation is no longer willing to recognize. Should an 
investing country insist on the recognition of its supposed treaty 
rights in circumstances which the recipient country viewed as inim-
ical to its national security or well-being, the only foreseeable result 
would be the modification of the treaty. As the Franco-American 
Treaty may, by its terms, be terminated in 1969, the American gov-
ernment has, no doubt, taken this factor into account in determining 
its actions. 
While the Rome Treaty offers additional guarantees of freedom 
of investment, it is the economic conditions of the Community and 
the political pressures by other member states for freedom of trade 
within the Community, rather than appeals to judicial determina-
tion of treaty rights, that may be expected to limit the use by France 
of its investment controls. Investors of states not members of the 
Community may be expected to profit less from the opportunity to 
assert against France legal benefits arising under the treaty by rea-
son of an establishment in another Community country than from 
the opportunity to use such an establishment as an alternative to 
investment in France.174 
VII. PERSPECTIVES 
The reservation by France of the right to screen foreign invest-
ments should not come as a surprise. While the language of the 1959 
Franco-American Treaty may be antipathetic to such screening, it is 
clear that changes in the amount and method of foreign, and partic-
ularly American, investment have caused the French government to 
conclude that such control is essential to its national interest. In this 
174. For a full expose of how American companies have made use of EEC invest-
ment opportunities, as well as of problems of American investment, see SERVAN· 
SCHREIBER, supra note 140. 
718 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 66:669 
limited way, France is espousing a position that has been adopted 
by many less-developed countries since World War II, a position 
which has made it nearly impossible for the United States to 
negotiate treaties of establishment permitting complete freedom of 
investment with such countries.175 
The extent of these reservations should not be exaggerated. The 
conclusion that a particular investment presents net economic and 
political disadvantages will, it is to be expected, result in disapproval 
only in aggravated cases. There is no reason, for example, for screen-
ing to have any effect on the hundreds of routine foreign investments 
annually made in France. The decision of an American to set up a 
small service company, a retail store, or a distribution outlet in 
France would warrant but little concern in terms of that conception 
of the national interest which motivates the investment controls. The 
investments which may affect such interests are those made by such 
corporations as International Business Machines, General Electric, 
or General Motors. Here, the economic, social, and political impacts 
are so great as to require careful governmental study. But even in 
such cases, the likely result will be approval of the investment. 
Perhaps one may also anticipate that the extraordinary veto power 
will be applied with diminishing frequency as the French economy 
integrates with that of the other members of the European Economic 
Community and larger European-owned industries are created, 
thereby lessening the fear of American domination. 
New and more rigid applications of France's investment controls 
may be occasioned by the recently instituted American controls 
on capital transfers abroad.176 The new American measures affect 
the French economy in three ways: they practically declare a mor-
atorium on new direct investment in France through the exporta-
tion of capital from the United States;177 they limit the amount of 
earnings of French subsidiaries that may be reinvested in Western 
Europe;178 and they require the repatriation of a portion of the earn-
ings of French subsidiaries of American companies.179 While this 
moratorium seems, at first glance, to limit drastically, if not to curtail 
fully, the number of new declarations of United States' direct invest-
ments which will be made in France, in fact this may not be the final 
175. See Metzger, The Individual and International Law: Property Interests [Sum-
mer Conference on Int'l Law, Cornell University (1964)], in 1 S. METZGER, I.Aw OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 102 (1966). 
176. Executive Order No. 11387, 15 C.F.R. pt. 1000 (1968). 
177. 15 C.F.R. §§ 1000.503 &: .504{a){3) (1968) (a basic $100,000 limit). 
178. 15 C.F.R. § 1000.504(a)(3) (1968). 
179. 15 C.F.R. § 1000.202 (1968). 
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result. A noteworthy exception to the new United States Department 
of Commerce regulations permits American companies and their 
foreign subsidiaries to raise money abroad (including Euro-Dollars) 
for foreign direct investments;180 thus, it may be assumed that United 
States' investment in France will not be totally prevented, even 
though financing will be more costly if new pressures on the Euro-
pean capital market drive interest rates up. But this dual United 
States' policy of prohibiting American dollars from leaving the coun-
try, while permitting foreign investment through foreign bor-
rowing, might make it increasingly difficult for French companies 
to raise money at reasonable rates and consequently may encounter 
resistance in France. The French government, under the broad pow-
ers granted by the new law, in pursuance of its own economic 
and political goals, including a desire to strengthen its balance of 
payments, could well decide to impose special restrictions on re-
course by foreign companies to the French capital market. This 
could effectively be accomplished by requiring foreign investments 
in France to be made only with capital imported from abroad, a 
requirement which had been imposed in every investment license 
under the pre-1967 exchange controls and which had been imposed 
to some degree in investments processed under the 1967 procedures 
even prior to the new United States' controls.181 Moreover, as the 
Ministry of Finance apparently finds "discriminatory" the newly 
enacted United States' regulations requiring foreign subsidiaries of 
American firms to repatriate earnings, further actions, such as the 
re-evaluation of the status of these French companies, and the con-
ditions of their access to the financial market and terms of bank 
credit, may be considered.182 
Despite the prospect of continuing and even expanding applica-
tion of French foreign investment controls it may be hoped that, as 
to American investment, these controls will be applied in the spirit 
in which, as expressed by Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, the 
1959 treaty was signed: 
Henceforth, when substantial amounts of capital are to be invested 
180. 15 C.F.R. § 1000.504(b) (1968). 
181. In some cases, the Ministry of Finance has required direct investors to modify 
their proposed investments to increase the percentage of capital obtained from foreign 
sources and to reduce, consequently, contemplated local borrowings. In certain other 
cases the Ministry has required that increases in a French subsidiary's capital struc-
ture be accomplished with money exported by the foreign parent. 
182. Statement attributed to Minister of Finance Michel Debre. Le Monde, Jan. 9, 
1968, at 15, col. 3; International Herald Tribune, Jan. 8, 1968, at I, col. 5. One of the 
reasons which might lead to such actions would be excessive demands by those French 
subsidiaries on the French money market in view of their need to repatriate earnings. 
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in either country or enterprises established for export-import, those 
concerned will receive without difficulty the necessary authorizations 
for admission, residence and establishment. In general, requests from 
citizens wishing to establish themselves in the other country will be 
considered favorably. Companies, subsidiaries, branches and agencies 
from the other country will receive the same treatment as na-
tionals.183 
The greatest barrier to the realization of these hopes is the very 
concrete possibility that the new controls will be considered by their 
administrators to be permanent and not temporary in nature, and 
that their full exercise will be considered to be normal rather than 
unusual. Unless the French authorities guard against this, the admin-
istration of "screening" apparatus may soon resemble the edifice of 
exchange controls which was so recently and welcomely demolished. 
183. Remarks of Foreign Minister Couve de Murville to the Annual Meeting of 
the American Chamber of Commerce in France, Jan. 19, 1960, quoted in COMMERCE 
IN FRANCE No. 238, at 2 (1967). 
